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0.1 Introduction
A central problem in cognitive sciences concerns the ability to represent
our own or others’ mental representations, what has been variously labeled
as mindreading, theory of mind, folk psychology, or mentalizing. Many of
our mental states represent how the world is, for example, the belief that “it
is raining” represents a state in the world. Mental representations that are
directed towards the world are called first-order representations. First-order
representations, however, are themselves potential objects of representation.
For example, “John knows that Mary loves him” is a second-order represen-
tation, and “John knows that Mary knows that he knows that Mary loves
him” involves several levels of second-order representation. Mindreading, or
mental state attribution, is a species of second-order representation that en-
ables humans to explain, predict, and interpret behavior in mental terms.
But how, exactly, this ability is acquired, and what kind of mechanisms un-
derpin its operation? I will clarify these questions shortly, but let us first
take a quick look at the philosophical background of the problem.
0.1.1 Other Minds and Mental State Terms
According to an influential view in philosophy of science, the criterion
must be used to test the genuineness of scientific statements is the criterion
of empirical verifiability. On this view, developed by logical positivists, sci-
entific statements are factually significant if and only if the statements are,
at least in principle, empirically verifiable. In Schlicks well-known slogan
(Schlick, 1936), the meaning of an expression is the method of its verifica-
tion. But if so, then how does the use of unobservable, theoretical entities
in science square with this empiricist view? If empiricism is right about
the science—that is if the source of the meaning of scientific statements lies
in their relation to observation and experience—then what constitutes the
semantics of theoretical terms such as “gravity”, “electron”, and “gene”?
The same question arises in psychology. Mental states such as belief, desire,
intention, pain and other psychological terms are theoretical, unobservable
entities. What fixes the semantics of mental state terms in psychology?
One solution to this problem was behaviorism: the verification conditions
for the meaning of mental state terms are behavioral. According to behav-
iorism, mental states do not refer to psychological episodes inside a person,
rather, to say that a person is in a particular mental state simply means the
same as saying, in an open-end list of statements, that the person is either
behaving or has the disposition to behave in certain ways. The behaviorist
position faced serious problems, perhaps the most notorious one was that the
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account is circular. It was demonstrated that analyzing attribution of men-
tal states in behavioral terms cannot be achieved unless our analysis makes
reference to other mental states. The behaviorist account was replaced by a
di↵erent view, developed by Lewis (Lewis, 1970, 1972), according to which
theoretical terms get their meaning by being embedded in the theory in which
they are used. On this account, theoretical terms have functional definition,
that is, they are defined as the occupants of the causal roles specified by the
theories within which they occur (Lewis, 1972, p. 254). So, the terms “grav-
ity” and “electron” get their meaning by the causal roles the terms play in
laws and generalizations of physics. Likewise, the semantics of mental states
is constituted by the roles the terms play in the psychological theory in which
they figure, a theory which has been invented long before the emergence of
modern psychology. But what constitutes this folk psychological theory?
Lewis remarks:
Collect all the platitudes you can think of regarding the causal
relations of mental states, sensory stimuli, and motor responses.
. . . Include only platitudes which are common knowledge among
useveryone knows them, everyone knows that everyone else knows
them, and so on . . . and I am going to claim that names of mental
states derive their meaning from these platitudes. (Lewis, 1972,
p. 256)
So the content of the theory is constituted by a set of law-like generaliza-
tions that specify causal relations between mental states, sensory stimuli,
and motor responses. The theory not only fixes the meaning of mental state
terms and explains the regularities between sensory stimuli and behavioral
responses, but also provide a solution to the other minds problem.
If, as Descartes believed, mind and body are fundamentally di↵erent (one
located in space-time, the other not spatially located) and I am the only per-
son who experiences my psychological states, then my belief in the existence
of other minds might be seriously mistaken. Of course, we hardly doubt that
others have a mental life, but what justifies this certainty? This has been
one of the main and long-standing problems in the philosophy of mind. An
immediate answer to this question is that we come to know what is going
on in the others’ mind by observing their behavior. However, the evidence
(observed behavior) could have been produced by mindless bodies. It could
be that others behave as if they are mindful, without actually experiencing
any inner life. If so, then attribution of mental states to others is not easily
justified.
How folk psychology solves the other minds problem? The convictions
that others experience a mental life is not inferred from observing others’
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behavior, nor it is derived by analogy from our access to our own mental
life, but it can be seen as an explanatory hypothesis that, in conjunction
with generalizations of folk psychology, provides explanation and prediction
of others’ behavior (Churchland, 1981, p. 69). Now, while mindreading is
understood as a descendant of the other minds problem (Goldman, 2006;
Nichols & Stich, 2003; Stich & Nichols, 2002), for researchers working on
mindreading today there is nothing problematic about other minds. Rather,
mindreading is seen as an “ability” that its execution serves the function of
explaining and prediction others’ behavior. The key question is that how
mindreading is accomplished and what mechanisms underpin its operation.
0.1.2 Mindreading and Psychology
Empirical research on mindreading was launched by two primatologists,
Premack & Woodru↵ (1978), who reported a series of problem-solving ex-
periments on a chimpanzee named Sarah. In one experiment, videotapes of
a human actor were presented who desired to eat bananas that were horizon-
tally or vertically out of reach. Several photographs were presented, one of
them was a solution to the problem, e.g. a stick to reach the bananas. Sarah
solved the problem by consistently selecting the correct photographs, but
the authors remarked that the subject’s excellent performance was possible
only if she could take into account the actor’s mental states, specifically, the
actor’s intention and desire to reach the bananas. The study by Premack
& Woodru↵ was followed by commentaries from a number of philosophers,
including Bennett (1978), Dennett (1978), Pylyshyn (1978), and Harman
(1978), remarking that we could never be sure that Sarah can think about
another mind as long as her own mind is su cient to solve the problem.
What is required is to see if Sarah (or any creature for that matter) can
make judgments about a target who has mental states di↵erent from her
own, or by taking into account another’s false belief. The commentaries re-
sulted in devising a procedure that is now well known as the false-belief test,
the acid test for the theory of mind.
0.1.2.1 The False-belief Test
The criterion suggested by philosophers was put into practice in a study
by two psychologists, Wimmer & Perner (1983), who presented children a
puppet show about two characters, Sally and Anne. Sally places his toy in
a basket and leaves the scene. In his absence, Anne transfers the toy from
the basket to a box. Children were then asked: when Sally returns, where
will she look for his toy? The results show that children younger than 3
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and a half fail to pass the test. Di↵erent versions of the test have been used
in numerous studies, but they are all methodological variants of two basic
procedures labeled as “unexpected content” or “unexpected transfer”. The
unexpected transfer is a variant of the original study by Wimmer & Perner
(1983). In the unexpected content scenario, the child is shown a familiar
container, often a tube of Smarties, and is asked what is inside. Then,
contrary to the child’s expectation, it is revealed that the real content is
something quite di↵erent, pencils for example. Next, the child faces the test
question: what someone else, the child who is outside the room and has not
seen inside the box, will think is in the box. No matter which procedure is
used, to give a correct answer in a false-belief test, the child must be able to
set aside his own representations of reality and think about what the target
thinks about a given situation, for example, to think what Sally thinks about
the toy’s location, and realize that Sally’s action relies on a false belief, or
misrepresentation, of reality. But how is this achieved? Theory-theory (TT)
and simulation theory (ST) are the two dominant accounts developed to
answer this question.
0.1.3 The Theory-Theory
According to one still dominant view, theory-theory, mindreading is guided
and executed by a theory. In their commentaries on the chimpanzee’s success,
Premack & Woodru↵ (1978) argued that
a system of inferences of this kind is properly viewed as a theory,
first, because such states are not directly observable, and second,
because the system can be used to make predictions, specifically
about the behavior of other organisms. (Premack & Woodru↵,
1978, p. 515)
Similarly, to account for the failure in the false belief test, it was argued that
young children’s failure and autistic subjects’ di culty with the test is the
result of a not matured theory of mind (Leslie, 1987; Leslie & Frith, 1988).
To succeed in the test, the child must be able to entertain a counterfactual
situation, that “Sally believes that the toy is in the basket” even though she
knows that the toy is not, in fact, in the basket. To achieve this, however, the
child must possess a body of psychological knowledge, together with some
processing mechanisms, such as the inference mechanism, that will put the
psychological knowledge into use (Davies & Stone, 1995).
On TT account, we understand others “because we share a tacit command
of an integrated body of lore concerning the law-like relations holding among
external circumstances, internal states, and overt behavior”(Churchland, 1981,
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p. 69). Moreover, the structural features of the theory “parallels perfectly
those of mathematical physics; the only di↵erence lies in the respect domain
of abstract entities they exploit” (Churchland, 1981, p. 71). The laws repre-
sent various relations holding in the domain of psychology, which is adequate
to the demands of everyday life. Everybody knows, for example, that “peo-
ple who are angry are generally impatient”, or if S desires P and believes
that Q is a means to P, and S has no overriding desires, S will generally
try to bring it about that Q (Churchland, 1981; Churchland & Churchland,
1998). However, it is notable that TT theorists disagree over the acquisition
problem, some argue for an innate and modular version of TT (Leslie, 1994,
2000) whereas others argue that the theory is acquired in much the same
way that scientific theories are acquired (Gopnik & Meltzo↵, 1997; Perner,
1991).
Understanding others in terms of law-like generalizations seems problem-
atic in at least two respects. Phenomenologically speaking, it does not seem
that people understand and interact with others by going through an in-
ferential process in which they deduce an explanandum (a mental state or
a future behavior) by using a set of generalizations. In addition, frequent
use of deductive processes seems cognitively too demanding. To avoid these
problems, TT theorists have recently revised their view, characterizing the
theory as an internally represented “knowledge structure” (Stich & Nichols,
1992) or model theories (Godfrey-Smith, 2005; Maibom, 2007, 2009), rather
than law-like generalizations (Churchland, 1981). Understood this way, the
processes operating to produce explanations or predictions do not need to
be inferential, or at least nomological-deductive. In this more general sense,
TT is understood as an information-rich process.
The theory-theory approach is a product of functionalism and has been
the dominant explanatory strategy in understanding mindreading. (Stich &
Nichols, 1992). In the late 1980s, however, a number of theorists laid down
serious challenges to TT and developed an alternative view under the label
of “simulation theory”.
0.1.4 The Challenge from Simulation Theory
In the late 1980s, Gordon (1986) and, independently, Heal (1986) put for-
ward the simulation hypothesis as an alternative to TT and functionalism.
The view was further developed and defended by other theorists and psychol-
ogists, most notably Goldman (1989) and Harris (1992). Later, Goldman
(2006) presented the most thoroughly developed and empirically informed
defense of the simulation theory (ST). According to the advocates of the sim-
ulation hypothesis, understanding others is achieved by simulation, that is,
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by imaginatively putting ourselves in the target’s shoes, answering the ques-
tion “what would I do in that person’s situation?”(Gordon, 1986). Although
details about how the simulation works slightly di↵er among simulation the-
orists, they all agree that we understand others by simulation, and without
collapsing into theorizing, as long as two conditions are satisfied. First, the
initial states of the simulating system are relatively similar to the mental
states of the target. Second, the mechanism driving simulation is similar to
the mechanism that drives the target (Goldman, 1989, 2006).
On a typical simulational account of action prediction, we put ourselves
in the other’s shoes and imagine what our mental states would be if we were
in that target’s situation. This “imaginative identification” (Gordon, 1992)
or “transformation” (Gordon, 1996) would generate mental states that stand
as representational surrogates for those of the target. The generated states,
“tagged” as belonging to the target, are then fed into the decision-making
or practical reasoning, mechanism. Because during simulation the decision-
making system operates o↵-line—that is, it is disengaged from the motor
control system and its normal operation—the output of the system, instead
of generating action, is attributed to the target. Unlike TT, simulation is
understood as an information-poor process.
The simulational account of mindreading has significant philosophical
implications, in particular, it raises serious problems for functionalism and
eliminativism. If mindreading is simulational and understanding others does
not depend on a theory of mind, then the functionalist account of the meaning
of mental state terms must be mistaken, because the assumption of a folk
psychological theory that fixes the semantics of mental state terms would
be explanatorily redundant. And, if there is no folk theory, it hardly makes
sense to claim, as eliminativists do, that our common sense psychological
theory is a defective theory that part or all of it will vanish in future.
In the last two decades, the debate between TT and ST has continued
with highly sophisticated arguments on both sides; however, the progress
was limited to articulating hybrid theories. However, by the turn of the
century and following the discovery of mirror neurons there was a resurgence
of interest in mindreading debates, in particular a revival of interest in the
simulation hypothesis.
0.1.5 Mirror Neurons: Evidence from Cognitive Neuroscience
Two things happened by the turn of the century. First, whereas dis-
cussions in the early stages were mainly focused on propositional attitudes
(beliefs, desires, intentions, etc.), a great deal of recent work on mindreading
is devoted to the attribution of emotions and sensations. Second, positions
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in those early days were mainly supported by evidence from developmental
psychology, whereas recent theories, in particular, the simulational accounts,
strongly rely on evidence from cognitive neuroscience. Specifically, the dis-
covery of mirror neurons and mirror processes has opened a new angle into
the mindreading debates.
One of the distinguishing features of (region) F5 neurons in the premotor
cortex is that they code execution of goal-directed motor acts (Pellegrino,
Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese,
2001). However, it was incidentally discovered that a large proportion of F5
neurons fire in response to the presentation of motor acts, for example when
the monkey only observes hand or mouth grasping (Pellegrino et al., 1992).
Subsequent studies revealed that neurons in this region discharge both during
observation and execution of the same action (Rizzolatti et al. 1996a; Gallese
et al., 1996). Neurons with this property are dubbed mirror neurons because
the brain in the observation mode behaves as if it mirrors the brain during
the execution mode.
The discovery of mirror neurons has inspired a resurgence of interest in
the simulation hypothesis. The link between mirror neurons and simulation
was first created in a paper by Gallese (one of the neuroscientists who discov-
ered mirror neurons) and Goldman published in 1998. Gallese and Goldman
argued that, whereas the endogenous activation of F5 neurons is interpreted
as constituting a “plan” to execute a certain action, the exogenous activation
of the neurons, when observing the same action performed by other individu-
als, constitutes a “plan” which, instead of leading to execution, is attributed
to the target. This is the way, they argued, we understand motor intentions.
But why is the process simulational? Because the activity of mirror neurons
“creates in the observer a state that matches that of the target. This is how
it resembles the simulation heuristic.” (Gallese & Goldman, 1998, p. 498).
Besides, Gallese and Goldman argue that the evidence does not mesh with
the TT account of mindreading because “nothing about TT leads us to ex-
pect this kind of matching” we see in mirror neurons (Gallese & Goldman,
1998, p. 498). Thus, the evidence from mirror neurons presents a basis for
empirically discriminating between TT and ST.
The simulational interpretation of mirror neurons is advocated by other
theorists as well. Fogassi et al. argue that mirror neurons not only code the
observed motor act but also allow the observer to understand the agent’s
intentions (Fogassi et al., 2005, p. 662), and Iacoboni et al. (2005) con-
sider mirror neurons as mechanisms responsible for understanding intentions.
The claim, however, is not limited to motor intentions. Mirror neurons are
discovered across di↵erent domains, including sensations and emotions of
fear (Adolphs et al., 2005), anger (Lawrence, Calder, McGowan, & Grasby,
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2002), pain (Singer et al., 2004), and touch (Keysers et al., 2004). Based
on this evidence, a number of theorists have argued that emotion and sen-
sation recognition is also simulational. Gallese et al. maintain that mirror
mechanisms “allow us to directly understand the meaning of the actions and
emotions of others by internally replicating (simulat-simulating) them with-
out any explicit reflective mediation” (Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004,
p. 396). Among the theorists, Goldman (2006) has provided the most com-
prehensive account of simulation, both at low-level, mirror-based recognition
of emotions and sensations and at high-level, imagination-based, attribution
of propositional states.
While the discovery of mirror neurons has rejuvenated the debates and
attracted a significant group of simulation advocates, several problems in the
literature remain unaddressed, including questions concerning the concept
of simulation, the precise role of mirror neurons in mindreading, the way
mirror neurons support ST, the reasons the processes do not square with
TT, and examination of the explanatory value of TT and ST in domains
where mindreading is exhibited. These questions are of prime interest in my
agenda.
0.1.6 The Central Hypotheses
This dissertation consists of five stand-alone sections, each dealing with
a di↵erent hypothesis on mindreading. Beginning with interpretation ques-
tions, section one examines the simulation hypothesis at the conceptual level.
How the ST theory, and the notion of simulation on which the theory relies,
ought to be understood. After evaluating several candidates, I argue that
the most promising senses of simulation, the similarity-based and the o↵-line
simulation, fail to discriminate simulational from non-simulational processes.
Simulation is a process, and a process P simulates another process P0 only
if P duplicates, or resembles P0 in some significant respects. But what are
the likely dimensions of resemblance between P and P0? Likely respects of
resemblance have already been discussed in the literature—process similar-
ity, concrete similarity, phenomenological, and functional similarity—all of
them, however, face serious problems (Section One). More recently, however,
ST theorists have argued that neurological similarity is the most promising
respect of resemblance in simulation. In section two, I criticize this view and
show that the processes involved in a class of celebrated simulation proto-
types do not show neurological similarity in the sense simulation theorists
contend.
Drawing on evidence from brain imaging and lesion studies, simulation
theorists have argued that in recognizing an emotion we use the same neural
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processes used in experiencing that emotion. In section three, I argue that
the view is fundamentally misguided. To show this, I will examine the sim-
ulational arguments for the three basic emotions of fear, disgust, and anger,
and argue that the simulational account relies strongly on a narrow sense of
emotion processing which hardly squares with evidence on how, in fact, emo-
tion recognition is processed. I contend that the current body of empirical
evidence suggests that emotion recognition is processed in an integrative sys-
tem involving multiple cross-regional interactions in the brain, a view which
also squares with understanding emotion recognition as an information-rich,
rather than simulational, process.
Section four examines the simulation hypothesis in connection with com-
munication, in particular, examine the explanatory power of ST in accounting
for the mindreading exhibited in utterance interpretation. I discuss several
problems with the simulation hypothesis, most importantly I argue that the
simulation strategy is not only cognitively too demanding but virtually inef-
fective in communicative contexts. Moreover, drawing on empirical evidence
from three clinical populations, I show that deficits in pragmatic interpreta-
tion are not associated with simulation impairments. Therefore, I argue that
simulation cannot play any significant role in utterance interpretation.
Section five links mindreading to moral psychology. For centuries, it is
believed that an agents action shows weakness of will if he acts, freely and in-
tentionally, counter to his own assessment of the action. In this final section,
I provide a framework for a more natural and empirically oriented account
of weakness of will. Relying on evidence from developmental psychology, I
argue that weakness of will is essentially nothing but an exercise in metarep-
resentation and intention recognition.
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0.2 The Concept of Simulation
Abstract
Simulation theorists argue that we can use our own mind as a model
to understand other minds. In spite of the attractiveness of the hy-
pothesis, it remains fairly unclear how the theory, and the notion of
simulation on which it depends, ought to be understood. I discuss
di↵erent senses of simulation and argue that the most promising sense
of simulation, the similarity-based and the o↵-line senses of simula-
tion, are faced with several problems; most importantly, they fail to
discriminate simulation from non-simulational processes.
0.2.1 Respects of Similarity
How is mental state attribution executed? According to one still dom-
inant view, the theory-theory, mental state attribution, or mindreading, is
underpinned by a set of mental representations and processes that operate
on these representations. Mindreading, on the theory-theory account, is un-
derstood as an information-rich process. However, in the last two decades
or so the theory-theory position is challenged by a rather di↵erent view, the
simulation theory, whose advocate hold that mindreading is subserved by a
process of simulation in which, instead of relying on a theory of target, we
use our own mind as a model for the other person’s mental life. Mindreading
on the simulational account is basically understood as an information-poor
process (Davies & Stone, 1995a, 1995b; Nichol & Stich, 2003).
Although the simulation theory is supported by a considerable number
of theorists, even a cursory glance at the literature reveals that the notion
of simulation is understood in heterogeneous ways such that so many of the
processes that the advocates of simulation theory see as simulational have
no or hardly anything in common. For instance, Robert Gordon, one of the
original advocates of the simulation theory, understood simulation in terms
of “imaginative identification” (Gordon, 1992) and “imaginative transforma-
tion” (Gordon, 1996). Paul Harris (1992) and Jane Heal (1996) supported a
version of simulation which is not imagination-based, but rather involves a
process in which a mindreader simulates by actually placing himself in a sit-
uation which is very similar to the target’s. And, Goldman (Goldman, 1989,
2006) proposed a notion of simulation which, although similar to Gordon’s
is imagination-based, operates in a particular way in which the simulating
system is taken o↵-line and is provided with pretend inputs, the so-called
o↵-line simulation.
So, despite the theory’s wide range of applications and its attractiveness
to a significant group of advocates, it remains fairly unclear how the theory,
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and the notion of simulation on which it relies, ought to be understood. In
reaction to this situation, Stich and Nichols (Nichols & Stich, 2003; Stich,
2009; Stich & Nichols, 1997) have frequently remarked that the diversity
among the processes to which simulation theorists have attached the label
simulation “is so great that the term itself has become quite useless. It picks
out no natural or theoretically interesting category” (Stich & Nichols, 1997,
p. 299). However, Goldman, the most prominent defender of the simula-
tion theory, resists this complaint and insists that “there is unity amid this
diversity; simulation is still a natural and theoretically interesting category.
Analogously, although there are many di↵erent atomic elements, the cate-
gory “atomic element” is a natural and theoretically interesting category.”
(Goldman, 2006, p. 35).
Since Goldman “does not want to defend every application of the term
‘simulation’ that anybody has ever proposed” (Goldman, 2009c, p. 138), he
sets out his own definition of simulation. So, if P and P0 are two processes,
what is required for P to qualify as a simulation of P0? Here is Goldman’s
first pass at defining generic simulation:
Generic Simulation (initial): Process P is a simulation of another
process P0 = df.
P duplicates, replicates, or resembles P0 in some significant re-
spects (significant relative to the purposes of the task). (Gold-
man, 2006, p. 36)
As Goldman remarks, P and P0 are token processes rather than process types,
and P can have any temporal relation to P0. Further, the simulated activity
P0 might be only hypothetical rather than actual—as when a flight simula-
tor simulates a crash that never corresponds to a real crash. One problem,
Goldman notes, with this initial definition of generic simulation is that “du-
plication, or resemblance, is symmetrical, whereas simulation is not” (Gold-
man, 2006, p. 37). An actual flight might resemble or duplicate a flight
simulation, but it doesn’t simulate what happens in a flight simulator. This
suggests that, on Goldman’s view, there is more to simulation than mere
duplication. In the case of mindreading, he remarks, it is the mental activity
of the mindreader (simulator) that simulates that of the target, not the other
way around. One way to get around this problem would be as follows:
Simply require that the simulating process occur out of the pur-
pose, or intention, to replicate the simulated process . . . This
won’t quite work, however, because it is doubtful that all sim-
ulation is purposeful. Some simulation may be automatic and
nonpurposeful. (Goldman, 2006, p. 37)
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To overcome the problem, Goldman suggests that, even without purposeful-
ness, one phenomenon count as a simulation of another “if it is the function
of the former to duplicate or resemble the other” (Goldman, 2006, p. 37).
This revises the initial definition of generic simulation as follows:
Generic Simulation (revised): Process P simulates process P0 =
df.
(1) P duplicates, replicates, or resembles P0 in some significant
respects (significant relative to the purposes or function of the
task), and
(2) in its (significant) duplication of P0, P fulfills one of its pur-
poses or functions. (Goldman, 2006, p. 37)
Generic simulation applies to both mental and nonmental processes. So,
Goldman defines mental simulation as follows:
Mental Simulation: Process P is a mental simulation of target
process P0 = df.
Both P and P0 are mental processes (though P0 might be merely
hypothetical), and P and P0 exemplify the relation of generic sim-
ulation as previously defined. (Goldman, 2006, p. 37-8).
This definition, although developed with care and in minute detail, is
still rather vague and o↵ers no real help. It is fairly unclear what is precisely
intended by “duplication” or “resemblance” in (1), and what the terms “pur-
pose” and “function” exactly designate in (2). So lets clarify (1) and (2) each
in turn.
Let P and P0 be fundamentally di↵erent systems. P might be an ab-
stract entity such as a scientific model (e.g. the Bohr model of the atom) in
which an identifying description allows for a surrogative reasoning about the
target. But some abstract models need to be physically implemented and
experimented upon in order to fulfill their representational function. For
example, computer simulations are of mathematical nature, but are realized
and run as a program in a computer in order to solve equations that rep-
resent the time-evolution of a target system. What kind of resemblance is
involved here? At the physical level of description, a computer simulation
bears no physical resemblance to its target. There is no physical resemblance
between the computer simulations of, for example, human brain and particu-
lar human brains. Furthermore, computer simulations and simulated system
do not work according to the same rules and principles (Haugeland, 1989).
The rules that govern simulation of human brain di↵er from the rules that
govern operations of particular brains. Given the dissimilarities, how does a
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computer simulation represent? It neither goes through the states that tran-
spires in the target nor follows the same principles that govern operations in
the target. Rather, the success of simulation in this case relies on a theory
or an accurate description of the target. As Goldman puts it, “if a computer
or a person seeks to simulate a system fundamentally di↵erent from itself
(e.g., a weather system or an economy), it must be driven by a good theory
of that target. Let us call this theory-driven simulation.” (Goldman, 2006,
p. 32). So, simulation would be theory-driven if P and P0 stand for processes
in fundamentally di↵erent systems. But theory-driven duplication is not the
intended sense of resemblance in (1).
To avoid theory-driven simulation, let P and P0 be similar, rather than
di↵erent, systems. For instance, there are cases, where either there is no
precise theory of how a target system works or if there is, it is either imprac-
tical or too complicated to use the theory. In such cases, a rather di↵erent
strategy is to use a second system that stands for the target system. For ex-
ample, scientists very often use monkey brains as a model organism to learn
more about the human brain. In this case, the monkey brain represents
the human brain by following the same principles and undergoing the same
states that occur in the human brain. In other words, as far as the success of
the modeling is concerned, the monkey brain represents the human brain by
concrete resemblance (Fisher, 2006), rather than by appealing to a theory of
the target. This form of process-driven (Goldman, 1989) simulation might
be the relevant respect of similarity in (1). Thus, (1) can be slightly modified
as P simulates P0 only if P concretely duplicates or resembles P0.
When two systems show concrete similarity, it seems that the simulat-
ing system is like a faithful replication of the target. But there is no such
thing as a perfectly faithful replication; replication, even in concretely sim-
ilar systems, is always restricted to some respects. To put it di↵erently, a
simulating system might resemble the target in some respects and still be
di↵erent in others. This raises the question of which respects of resemblance
are significant for the purpose of simulation. One very outstanding respect of
similarity in simulation strategy is phenomenology. Here is how phenomeno-
logical respect figures in simulationists’ arguments:
The simulation idea has obvious initial attractions. Introspec-
tively, it seems as if we often try to predict others’ behavior—or
predict their (mental) choices—by imagining ourselves in their
shoes and determining what we would choose to do. (Goldman,
1989, p. 169)
To see the point, consider, for example, a study by Kahneman and Tver-
sky (1981), where subjects were asked to consider two travelers, Mr. Crane
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and Mr. Tees, who were scheduled to leave the airport on di↵erent flights,
at the same time. They traveled from town in the same limousine, which
was caught in a tra c jam, and arrived at the airport 30 minutes late. Mr.
Crane is told his flight left on time. Mr. Tees is told that his flight was
delayed, and just left 5 minute ago. Who do you think is more upset? 96%
of subjects said that Mr. Tees was more upset. How did they come up with
this answer? Goldman remarks that, “each subject would have put himself
in each of the imaginary traveler’s shoes and imagined how he would have
felt [emphasis added] in that place” (Gallese & Goldman, 1998, p. 496).
So, in understanding the target, each subject simulates by undergoing an
emotional contagion that bears phenomenological resemblance to what hap-
pens in the target. Similarly, Gordon (1986) maintains that in predicting
the behavior of others, we simulate by answering the question ‘what would
I do in that person’s situation?’. This involves, on Gordon’s account, to
imaginatively project into the other’s situation in the same way that chess
players in playing against an opponent, while ‘transported in imagination’,
visualize the board form the other side and act accordingly. Thus, the idea
of putting oneself in the other’s shoes involves mindreader to be engaged
in a form of ‘empathetic understanding’(Gordon, 1986) and forming mental
imageries which are associated with phenomenological resemblance to what
happens in the target.
Phenomenological resemblance, despite its initial attraction, confronts se-
rious problems. First, although studies show phenomenological resemblance
during, for example, introspective imagery (Kahneman & Tversky, 1981),
or observation and attribution of some emotional facial expressions (Wicker
et al., 2003), the cases are restricted only to the attribution of perceptual,
emotional or sensational states. But mindreading often involves attribu-
tion of other types of mental states including beliefs, intentions, desires and
all the so-called propositional states. Propositional states, however, do not
have perceptual or emotional content, thus hard to see how their attribu-
tion might be associated with phenomenological properties. Second, phe-
nomenology is absent even in the attribution of emotional and sensational
states. Recently, Goldman (2006) has distinguished between high-level and
low-level mindreading, and argued that low-level mindreading is the auto-
matic and unconscious process of detecting emotional and sensational states.
How can something that happens automatically and subconsciously be as-
sociated with phenomenological properties? There is indeed a general con-
sensus among theorists that mindreading largely occurs below the threshold
of consciousness. If so, then phenomenology is not always associated even
with the attribution of emotional and sensational states. What about cases
like the above studies by Kahneman and Tversky (1981) or Wicker et al.
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(2003) that simulation theorists cite? Well, we must ask: is phenomenology
conceived as not compatible or incapable of harmonious combination or co-
existence with other non-simulational processes? If not, then even in cases
where mental state attribution is associated with phenomenological resem-
blance, the resemblance in question does not necessarily entail simulation.
That is, despite showing phenomenological resemblance, it might turn out
that the attribution in those cases is guided and executed by a theory-driven
or other type of non-simulational process. I conclude that phenomenology
cannot be the intended respect of similarity in Goldman’s definition in (1).
What might be the possibly more relevant respects of resemblance in sim-
ulation? Goldman notes, “the respects of resemblance I shall highlight are
functional or neural” (Goldman, 2006, p. 151). Beginning with functional, or
input/output, similarity, several problems arises immediately. To begin with,
the simulation prototypes, for instance, the simulational accounts of action
prediction (Goldman, 1989, 2006), predicting grammatical judgment (Har-
ris, 1992) and inference prediction (Nichols & Stich, 2003; Stich & Nichols,
1995) are all accounts that rely on functional dissimilarities. For instance,
on the standard simulational account of action prediction, we take our own
decision-making system o↵-line and provide it with pretend inputs, and let
it to output a decision which we subsequently attribute it to the target. The
crucial point for our discussion is that the decision-making system during
simulation, compared to its standard (non-mindreading) operation, is taken
o↵-line and are provided with pretend inputs.1 Since the inputs are pretend,
that is, tagged as belonging to the target, they are associated with a pattern
of causal connections—connections to other mental states, internal mecha-
nisms, and output behavior—which is functionally di↵erent from the pattern
associated with genuine, non-pretend, inputs. As a result, the mechanism
that subserves simulation runs in a way di↵erent from the way it does in its
standard mode of operation. So, whereas during the online operation the
decision-making system takes standard inputs and returns a genuine deci-
sion, during simulation the system operates o↵-line and returns an output
which is disengaged from mindreader’s behavior. This shows why the simu-
lating system and target don’t resemble each other in functional terms. The
same functional dissimilarities hold in Harriss simulational account of gram-
maticality prediction (1992), or Stich and Nichols’ simulational account of
inference prediction (Nichols & Stich, 2003; Stich & Nichols, 1995).
So functional similarity does not hold in the prototype accounts of simu-
lation theory. But even if it does, it is not su cient for a process to qualify as
1Not all simulation theorists are committed to the o↵-line or pretense-drive simulation.
See, for instance, Harris (1992) and Heal (1996).
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simulational. Simulation theorists hold that a process counts as simulational
if the initial states and the simulating mechanism resemble to those of the
target. Here is how Goldman makes the point:
In the mindreading case, process-driven simulation can succeed
in producing a final state that is identical or isomorphic to that
of the target as long as (1) the process or mechanism driving
the simulation is identical, or relevantly similar, to the process or
mechanism that drives the target and (2) the initial states of the
simulating system (the attributor) are the same as, or relevantly
similar to, those of the target. Process-driven simulation does
not collapse into theorizing. (Goldman, 2006, p. 32)
Similarely, Currie & Ravenscroft remark:
It is a feature of simulative processes that the mechanism which
underpins the simulative process is of the same type as the mech-
anism which is being simulated. Thus, according to the simula-
tion account of the capacity to predict and explain action, the
simulative process involves the predictor’s decision-maker which
is type-identical to the target’s decision- maker: they are both
tokens of the type ‘normal human decision-maker’. (Currie &
Ravenscroft, 1997, p. 164)
However, a simulating system might resemble the target by these defi-
nitions and nevertheless still not qualify as a simulational process (Ramsey,
2010). To see this, consider the case where Mr. A believes that all philoso-
phers are shy. Mr. A is introduced to Mrs. B and he is told that she is a
philosopher. You are asked to predict what Mr. A will say if asked whether
Mrs. B is shy. How would you proceed to make this prediction? On one ac-
count, since this is an inference prediction, it begins by feeding the inference
mechanism with pretend inputs—that is, the assumptions that you think the
target holds, including the beliefs that ‘all philosophers are shy’ and ‘Mrs. B
is a philosopher’. The inference mechanism outputs that Mrs. B is shy. You
attribute the output to the target and come to believe that Mr. A thinks
that Mrs. B is shy. The process must count as simulational because, as stip-
ulated above, the initial states and the mechanism that drives the simulation
resemble to those of the target.2
However, this form of similarity holds even in a non-simulational or
information-rich account of your prediction. On an information-rich account,
2This is a modified version of what Stich and Nichols (1995) raise in their discussion
of type-2 Harris simulation.
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you begin by entertaining the relevant assumptions including Mr. A’s beliefs
that ‘all philosophers are shy’, and ‘Mrs. B is a philosopher’. Since this is
an inference prediction, the assumptions are fed as input into the inference
mechanism. The inference mechanism, provided with the inputs, along with
the aid of a tacit theory of reasoning, returns that Mr. A thinks that Mrs.
B is shy. Thus, input/output similarity is not even su cient for simulation.
0.2.2 Neurological Similarity and Simulational Models
One way to avoid the above problem is to look for a stronger conception
of similarity at a lower level of description that goes beyond input/output
similarity. One serious possibility here is neurological resemblance. Several
findings from cognitive neuroscience show an overlap in neuronal discharge
between di↵erent modes of endogenous and exogenous activation during, for
instance, motor actions (Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti,
1992; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996), sensation and emotional
responses in fear (Adolphs et al., 1999; Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Dama-
sio, 1994), disgust (Phillips et al., 1997; Wicker et al., 2003), pain (Jackson,
Meltzo↵, & Decety, 2005; Singer et al., 2004), and anger (Lawrence & Calder,
2004; Lawrence, Calder, McGowan, & Grasby, 2002), among others. In each
case, the brain during the observation mode activates as if it is mirroring the
activity of the brain during the execution/experience mode. For example, in
the case of motor mirror neurons, observing a hand grasping an apple causes
the observer’s motor system to resonate, in the sense that the same popu-
lation of neurons (in the premotor cortex) that controls the grasping of an
apple also becomes active during the observation of the grasping movement.
Likewise, there seems to be a neurological resemblance between the experi-
ence and recognition of certain emotions and sensations (more discussion on
this below). This presumably can turn the above formulation into a more
promising shape in which P simulates P0 only if P resembles, or duplicates, P0
in neurological terms. Neurological resemblance, however, faces three serious
problems.
First, mental simulations are used to answer questions or form beliefs
about other people (Goldman, 2006, p. 39). This presumably implies that
simulation, whether it is used for mindreading or other purposes, has an
epistemic purpose, that is, it facilitates acquiring information about a tar-
get system. However, consider the cases when, for instance, when sports
fans who, while observing an athlete doing an exercise, tend to ‘help’him by
mimicking the athlete’s movements (Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001). In
such situations, whereas similar neural substrates are implicated during en-
dogenous and exogenous activations, the mimicry performed by sports fans
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hardly counts as processes that serving any epistemic purpose. If that is
the case, then there are situations where we have neurological resemblance
without having simulation. So, if P simulates P in terms of neurological re-
semblance, the problem arises as to how to discriminate processes which are
simulational, and so have an epistemic purpose, from processes such as ath-
letes’ mimicry which show neurological resemblance, but have no epistemic
purpose whatsoever.
Second, neural duplications, even when they serve a cognitive function,
may be involved in a large variety of purposes. For example, imitation is the
automatic tendency to reproduce an observed action. At the neurological
level, it is suggested that imitation is subserved by mirror neurons that, on
the one hand, code motor acts, and on the other, allow imitation to take
place (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti et al., 2001). This suggests
that imitation involves neurological resemblance. But it is notable that hu-
mans are capable of learning by imitation (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004).
This again shows a case of neurological resemblance which is not a case of
simulation. Advocates of the simulation theory would probably argue that
simulation is not restricted to mindreading, but rather is involved in a va-
riety of cognitive functions, including learning by imitation. This solution,
however, doesn’t seem to be helpful as in that case it would be hard to see
how simulation theory can discriminate simulation for mindreading from its
other functions, for example, simulation for the purpose of imitation.
Third, neurological similarity is not su cient for simulation. In other
words, a process might resemble, in neurological terms, a target process and
nevertheless qualify as an information-rich rather than simulational process.
Indeed, studies do suggest similarity, in neurological terms, between vision
and visualization, or action and motor imagination.3 However, in most cases,
visualization or motor imagery is under subject’s voluntary control and is of-
ten driven by information about the target’s situation. For instance, subjects
learn about the target by experimenters’ description, and even might be in-
structed on how to build up a mental representation of the target (Decety,
Jeannerod, & Prablanc, 1989). Sometimes the tasks involve making infer-
ences (Schwartz & Black, 1999), or is such that it taps into subjects memory
and knowledge (Meudell, 1971).4 Theory-driven neurological duplications,
however, do not qualify as simulational. So here again, there are cases where
we have neurological resemblance without having simulation. The problem
3See, for example, Jeannerod (2001) for neural similarity in motor imagination, and
Kosslyn et al. (1999) for visualization.
4The question as to whether visualization involves the same perceptual representations
as vision is quite contentious and has been the subject of debate in the literature. See, for
example, Pylyshyn (1973) and Farah (1988).
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then arises as to how simulation theory discriminates neurological duplica-
tions which are simulational from those which are information-driven.
Should we drop the similarity-based characterization of simulation? Not
any of the phenomenological or the functional forms of similarity seem to be
the intended respect of resemblance in (1), and the neurological resemblance,
as the most promising form of similarity, fails to discriminate simulation
from non-simulational processes. One way to avoid these problems might
be suggested by (2), where it has been remarked that P in its duplication
of P0 fulfills one of its functions. So, as it has been noted, “a phenomenon
intuitively counts as a simulation of another if it is the function of the former
to duplicate or resemble the other” (Goldman, 2006, p.37). This suggests
that P simulates P0 only of P resembles, or duplicates, P0 in neurological
terms, and P in its neurological duplication performs its function. This
suggestion, however, seems to be of little help. How are we to make sense
of the notion of function here? What is it for P to have the function of
(neurologically) duplicating, or resembling, P0? To be sure, the purpose or
function of simulation is to achieve mindreading. The question, rather, is
that how exactly a process serves this function, and what is required for a
process, in addition to neurological resemblance, to carry out this function?
We are not given a clue. Goldman remarks that “I lack a theory of function
to provide backing for this approach, but I shall nonetheless avail myself of
this notion“ (Goldman, 2006, p. 37).
To get around this problem, it might be suggested that we should take
into account that a distinguishing feature of simulation is that a mindreader
makes special use of her own mind (or brain) in assigning mental states to
others (Goldman, 2006, p.40). Specifically, it might be suggested that sim-
ulation involves that the simulating system operates o↵-line and is provided
with pretend or non-standard inputs. So, P simulates P0 only if P, in addition
to bearing neurological resemblance to P0, operates o↵-line and is provided
with pretend, or non-standard, inputs.
This option, however, does not seem to be helpful, because simulational
processes, at least for low-level mindreading where simulation theory can find
evidence for neurological similarities, neither operate o↵-line nor are pro-
vided with pretend inputs. First, o↵-line operation at low-level mindreading
involves the simulating process to be momentarily disengaged from the min-
dreader’s emotion, sensation, or motor control systems. However, none of
the four (low-levely mindreading) models proposed by simulation theorists
posit any o↵-line operation during the simulation process: 1) the Generate
and Test, 2) the Reverse Simulation, 3) the Simulation with as-if Loop, and
4) the Unmediated Resonance (Mirroring) (Goldman, 2006b; Goldman &
Sripada, 2005). To see this, let us very briefly review the operation of the
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four models.
In the Generate and Test model, generating a hypothesized emotion
prompts its natural facial expression in the mindreader; in the Reverse Sim-
ulation model, visual representation of the target’s facial expression gives
rise to the activation of the mindreader’s facial muscles which consequently
generates an experience of the corresponding emotional state; in the Simu-
lation with as-if Loop model, there is a link between a visual representation
of a targets facial expression and a somatosensory representation of ‘what
it would feel like’to make that expression, which generates the experience of
the corresponding emotion. Finally, in the Unmediated Resonance model,
observation of the target’s facial expression directly triggers activation of the
same neural substrate of the emotion in question, and as a result experience
of the corresponding emotion (Goldman, 2006b; Goldman & Sripada, 2005).
So the simulational processes, even when there is a neurological resemblance,
don’t operate o↵-line. Mirror neuron activation and mirror processes, ac-
cording to these models, is not disengaged but rather impacts the observers
facial expressions and his emotional or sensational system. As a result, the
mirroring process generates an output which is the genuine experience of an
emotion, not a pretend output. This generation of a genuine output is em-
phasized by simulation theorists. For example, Wicker et al. (2003) remark
that mirror neuron activation generates an emotional contagion, a feeling of
disgust, which must occur in the observer in order to understand the facial
expression of disgust. Similarly, Gallese (2001) suggests that understand-
ing emotions and sensations of others requires a self-other identity relation
which, in addition to the mirror activation, entails an emotional contagion.
I argued that mirror neurons don’t operate o↵-line, but mirror neurons
don’t operate on pretend inputs, either. Pretend inputs di↵er from the gen-
uine ones only in that they are ‘tagged’ as belonging to the target, but they
resemble the genuine inputs in that the pretend inputs are representational
surrogates for the inputs in the target (simulated) process. Indeed, this is
a requirement otherwise simulation would lead to less accurate or mistaken
results. However, this input commonality is absent in the endogenous and
exogenous activation of mirror neurons and processes. For example, dur-
ing action observation, the inputs into the parieto-frontal circuit arrive from
higher order visual areas, such as the superior temporal sulcus, whereas dur-
ing action execution, they mostly come from the temporal lobes (Rizzolatti &
Sinigaglia, 2010, p. 265). To put it more intuitively, whereas mirror neurons
during action observation are triggered by inputs from visual representation
of action and exteroceptive information, action execution is prompted by
proprioceptive and interoceptive inputs.
Moreover, a comparison between the endogenous and exogenous activa-
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tion of motor mirror neurons suggests that the neurons are only broadly
congruent in their responses to the observation and execution of e↵ective ac-
tions (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996). For example, two-thirds
of the F5 mirror neurons, in order to be triggered, don’t need the observation
of the action that they code during action execution. More interesting are
a set of mouth mirror neurons, called communicative neurons, which code
execution of ingestive actions, but the most e↵ective action for them during
observation are communicative gestures (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). So,
how can a set of neurons which code for a certain action, but visually respond
to a di↵erent action, have similar inputs under di↵erent modes of exogenous
and endogenous operation?
Taken together, mirror neurons neither run o↵-line, nor operate on pre-
tend inputs/outputs. Maybe, as it has been remarked (Goldman, 2009c, p.
149), generalizing o↵-line simulation to low-level mindreading is too narrow
and constraining. In that case, it seems that simulation theory is caught in a
thorny dilemma: either we keep o↵-line simulation within the bounds of high-
level mindreading and define simulation in terms of neural resemblance only,
in which case we face the above discussed problems; specifically, we fail to
discriminate simulation from non-simulational processes. Or, to avoid those
problems, we generalize o↵-line simulation to the low-level mindreading and
add it to the neurological similarity condition, in which case mirror-base min-
dreading would not qualify as simulational because the o↵-line description
would be too narrow and constraining.
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0.3 Simulation, Mirroring, and Neurological Similar-
ity
Abstract
Simulation is an interesting hypothesis proposed to account for our
ability of mental state attribution. However, in spite of its promi-
nence, it remains fairly unclear how the theory, and the notion of
simulation on which it depends, ought to be understood. This paper
addresses the most promising sense of simulation, the neurological
similarity, and argues that the processes involved in a class of cele-
brated simulation prototypes—that is, emotion recognition—do not
demonstrate similarity in the sense simulation theorists contend.
0.3.1 Two Requirements for Similarity
One interesting, but unresolved, question in cognitive sciences concerns
our ability of mental state attribution, often called mindreading. How is
mindreading accomplished? According to an interesting view, the simulation
theory (ST), we recognize and attribute mental states to others by using our
own mind as a model for the other person’s mental life. But, if P and P0 are
two processes, what is required for P to qualify as a simulation of P0? Simula-
tion theorists have been less than clear on this question, have used the term
simulation in a vague and heterogeneous ways, for instance, as “imagina-
tive identification” (Gordon, 1992), “imaginative transformation” (Gordon,
1996), placing oneself in the targets situation (Harris, 1992; Heal, 1996), and
o↵-line simulation (Goldman, 1989). So, despite the theory’s attractiveness
to a group of advocates, it remains fairly unclear how the theory, and the
notion of simulation on which it relies, ought to be understood.
In reaction to this situation, Stich and Nichols (Nichols & Stich, 2003;
Stich, 2009; Stich & Nichols, 1997) have frequently remarked that the di-
versity among the processes to which simulation theorists have attached the
label simulation “is so great that the term itself has become quite useless. It
picks out no natural or theoretically interesting category” (Stich & Nichols,
1997, p. 299). However, Goldman, the most prominent defender of the simu-
lation theory, resists this complaint and insists that “there is unity amid this
diversity; simulation is still a natural and theoretically interesting category.
Analogously, although there are many di↵erent atomic elements, the cate-
gory “atomic element” is a natural and theoretically interesting category.”
(Goldman, 2006, p. 35). But Goldman “does not want to defend every appli-
cation of the term ‘simulation’that anybody has ever proposed” (Goldman,
2009, p. 138). So, he sets out his own definition of simulation:
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Process P simulates process P0 = df.
(1) P duplicates, replicates, or resembles P0 in some significant
respects (significant relative to the purposes or function of the
task), and
(2) in its (significant) duplication of P0, P fulfills one of its pur-
poses or functions. (Goldman, 2006, p. 37)
This definition, although developed with care and in minute detail, is rather
vague and o↵ers no real help. It is fairly unclear what is precisely intended
by duplication, or resemblance in (1), and what the terms “purpose” and
“function” exactly designate in (2). Likely dimensions of similarity have
already been discussed in the literature, including process similarity, concrete
similarity, phenomenological, and functional similarity, all of them, however,
confront serious problems (Fisher, 2006; Goldman, 1989, 2006; Spaulding,
2012). More recently, however, Goldman has argued that better prospects
are found at the neurological level:
At the neurological level, there may be better prospects for find-
ing illuminating resemblances among processes. . . As I shall show,
however, there is lots of evidence of neural resemblances and they
greatly strengthen the case for simulation as a robust character-
istic of both mindreading and other forms of social cognition.
(Goldman, 2009b)
While the idea of neuronal similarity was first proposed in the motor
domain (Gallese & Goldman, 1998), the most extensive pieces of evidence
for neuronal similarity and mirror-based simulation, according to Goldman
(2009b, 2009a), are found in studies on emotion recognition. Characteriz-
ing simulation in terms of neuronal similarity is supported by two sorts of
evidence. First, brain imaging studies on normal participants show similar
brain activation during both experience and recognition of emotions. Second,
lesion studies demonstrate that damage to specific regions is accompanied by
selective impairments in recognition of certain emotions.
Several findings from brain imaging and lesion studies are collected to
show that the same neurological substrate underpins both experience and
recognition of certain emotions. For instance, it is argued that the amygdala
underpins both experience and recognition of fear, and the insula underpins
experience and recognition of disgust. More importantly, it is argued that
lesion studies demonstrate paired deficits (in experience and recognition)
that are selective, that is, whereas damage to the neural region responsible
for emotion E will impair mindreading E, it leaves intact recognition of other
emotions E0, E00, and so on. Evidence from lesion studies shows that,
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these deficits were selective in the sense that patients impaired
specifically in emotion X had no di culty in recognizing emotion
Y or Z but only in recognizing X. . . . One could also formu-
late the matter in terms of double, indeed triple, dissociations.
Recognition of emotion X can be intact while recognition of Y is
impaired, and recognition of Y can be intact while recognition of
X is impaired; and so forth. (Goldman, 2009b, p. 145-146)
According to Goldman, the selective impairments together with specific acti-
vation of the regions in normal participants, demonstrate that experiencing
an emotion and recognizing this same emotion depend on the same brain
structure.
I contend that the similarity-based characterization of simulation hypoth-
esis in terms of neurological similarity lays down two key requirements:
(1) that a brain region which is allegedly responsible for an emotion is
specifically and consistently activated during both experience and recogni-
tion of the respective emotion, and
(2) that damage to a region responsible for experiencing a certain emo-
tion would also impair recognition of that emotion.
Condition (1) requires specific and consistent activation. Specificity requires
that specific brain regions (e.g. the amygdala) be preferentially active for to-
kens of one, and only one, emotion category (e.g. fear). Consistency requires
that a region active for an emotion category to be active for every token of
that category. Condition (2) requires paired deficits in both experience and
recognition of an emotion. Let us call (1) and (2) the (neurological) similarity
requirements. In what follows, I will discuss the two basic emotions of fear
and disgust, where simulation theory has its best evidence for neurological
similarity, and argue that the processes involved in emotion recognition fail
to satisfy the similarity requirements.
Before moving on I want to preempt an objection one could make on
behalf of Goldman’s account. In addition to his definition of simulation,
Goldman draws an important distinction between successful and attempted
simulation. Attempted mental simulation is defined as follow:
Process P is an attempted mental simulation of process P0 if P and P0
are both mental processes, and P is executed with the aim of duplicating
or matching P0 in some significant respects. (Goldman, 2006, p. 38)
Simulation is either successful or attempted, and not all attempted simula-
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tions are accurate or successful. Neurological similarity between the simu-
lating system and target is expected only in cases of successful simulation.
Thus, simulation is not committed to the idea that mindreading will always,
or even usually, show neurological similarity.
This objection is unfounded. Goldman has distinguished between low-
level and high-level mindreading. High-level mindreading is the partly vol-
untary and to some degree conscious process of detecting propositional states
guided by imagination, and low-level mindreading is the automatic and un-
conscious detection of emotional states (Goldman, 2006, p. 43). Now,
whereas high-level mindreading requires only attempted, not successful, sim-
ulation, low-level mindreading is subserved by more primitive, automatic and
mirror mechanisms which requires genuine neurological resemblances. Thus,
although mistaken mental state attributions at high-level mindreading might
be accommodated as attempted simulation, low-level mindreading is pred-
icated “on genuine resemblances between states of the attributor and the
target. The case for high-level mindreading, by contrast, rests on the osten-
sible purpose or function of E-imagination, not on the regular achievement
of faithful reproductions” (Goldman, 2006, p. 150). A process counts as “at-
tempted mental simulation” only if the process is executed with the aim of
duplicating the processes of the target (see the definition above). However,
the term aim does not appear in Goldman’s account of low-level mindread-
ing. And, it hardly makes sense that a neuronal process is executed with the
aim of duplicating a neuronal target process.
With this observation in mind, let us see how low-level simulational ac-
count of fear and disgust meets the similarity requirements of (1) and (2).
0.3.2 Simulation and Neurological Similarity
Beginning with fear, we must ask, is the amygdala specifically a fear pro-
cessor? As Sander and colleagues remark (Sander, Grafman, & Zalla, 2003),
to show the specificity it needs to be demonstrated that the di↵erence ob-
tained in the amygdala activation for fear-inducing stimuli (versus neutral
stimuli) cannot be obtained when comparing amygdala activation for other
non-fear-related stimuli. However, most brain imaging studies show amyg-
dala activation for several emotions. For instance, Blair et al. (Blair, Morris,
Frith, Perrett, & Dolan, 1999) scanned thirteen normal subjects when sub-
jects viewed images of faces expressing varying degrees of sadness and anger
while performing a sex discrimination task (whether the person whose face
they saw was male or female). The results show enhanced activity of the
left amygdala associated with increasing intensity of sad and angry facial
expressions. Similarly, Whalen et al. (2001) found amygdala activation for
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angry expressions, and results from an fMRI study by Siegle et al. (Siegle,
Steinhauer, Thase, Stenger, & Carter, 2002) show amygdala activation to
negative, but not specifically fear-related, information in depressed individ-
uals.
In addition, other findings form brain imaging studies have found a broader
role for the amygdala than fear processing. Breiter et al. (1996) found amyg-
dala activation for happy versus neutral faces. In a brain imaging study
(Garavan, Pendergrass, Ross, Stein, & Risinger, 2001), subjects viewed pic-
tures that varied in emotional content (positive versus negative valence) while
undergoing fMRI scanning. The results showed significant amygdala activa-
tion for both positively and negatively valenced stimuli. Also, Wright and
colleagues (Wright, Martis, Shin, Fischer, & Rauch, 2002) evaluated human
brain responses to simple drawings of emotional and neutral facial expres-
sions. Significantly-increased fMRI signal was found in the amygdala in re-
sponse to angry and happy schematic faces. Some studies (Kim, Somerville,
Johnstone, Alexander, & Whalen, 2003; Wang, McCarthy, Song, & Labar,
2005) suggest amygdala’s role in processing facial expressions of surprise and
sadness. Other findings show amygdala response across all emotional expres-
sions. For instance, Yang et al. (2002) examined the amygdala in response to
the perception of happy, angry, sad and fearful facial expressions compared to
neutral expressions. The results demonstrate that all four facial expressions,
including happy faces, were associated with reliable bilateral activation of
the amygdala. Similarly, in a study by Winston et al. (Winston, ODoherty,
& Dolan, 2003), subjects viewed morphed emotional faces displaying low and
high intensities of disgust, fear, happiness or sadness under two di↵erent task
conditions. The amygdala responded to high-intensity expressions of all the
four basic emotions, suggesting that the amygdala is involved in perceptual
processing of a range of emotions, rather than fear only. In a brain imaging
study by Fitzgerald and colleagues (Fitzgerald, Angstadt, Jelsone, Nathan,
& Phan, 2006), 20 subjects viewed photographs displaying fearful, disgusted,
angry, sad, neutral and happy facial expressions. The left amygdala was ac-
tivated by each condition separately (emotional or non-emotional), and its
response was not selective for any particular emotion category.
In addition, the link between amygdala activation and fear-inducing stim-
uli has not been entirely consistent. Schienle et al. (A. Schienle et al., 2002)
and Stark et al. (Stark et al., 2003) obtained no amygdala activation. This
may suggest that the amygdala is not even necessary in fear processing. Fur-
ther, recent findings by Tsuchiya et al. (Tsuchiya, Moradi, Felsen, Yamazaki,
& Adolphs, 2009) and Piech et al. (Piech et al., 2010) on a patient SM with
bilateral amygdala damage show that SM’s speed performance on a rapid
detection task of fear-related stimuli was completely normal. This result, as
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the authors remark, suggests that the amygdala is not essential at least for
the early stages of fear processing.
I argued that amygdala is neither specifically nor consistently activated
during recognition of fear. That is, fear recognition does not satisfy (1).
Fear recognition does not satisfy (2) either; fear recognition is preserved
despite unilateral or bilateral amygdala damage. Hamann et al. (1996)
examine two patients, EP and GP, with complete bilateral amygdala damage
and additional lesions in temporal lobe structures. EP and GP were tested
twice, once using the exact material and procedures reported by Adolphs
et al., (1994), where they had previously found poor performance in a fear
recognition task in a patient with bilateral amygdala damage, and again
tested the patients in a slightly di↵erent version of the same experiment. The
patients, despite bilateral amygdala damage, appeared to be unimpaired in
recognition of fear or any other emotion category.
Besides, that one and the same neural substrate is not implicated in
both experience and recognition of fear is further confirmed by observing
that damage to regions other than the amygdala can impair fear recognition.
For instance, on a face emotion recognition task, Adolphs and colleagues
(Adolphs, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1996) examined 37 subjects with fo-
cal brain damage and compared their performances to the mean performance
of 15 normal controls. First, the study found no recognition impairment in
subjects with lesions restricted to left hemisphere. However, damage to the
right hemisphere was associated with impairments in emotion recognition.
Second, damage to the right anterior infracalcarine cortex was associated
with impairments in fear recognition. Taken together, the above results show
that fear recognition fails to satisfy both (1) and (2).
The next emotion is disgust. Does disgust recognition satisfy the similar-
ity conditions of (1) and (2)? It does not satisfy (1). To show that the insula
is specifically a disgust processor, it must be demonstrated that the di↵er-
ence in activation obtained for disgust cannot be obtained for other emotion
categories. However, the brain imaging studies by Philips et al. (1997) and
Wicker et al. (2003), on which the simulation account of disgust recognition
relies, examine the insula activation exclusively with respect to disgust; they
compare the insula activation for disgust relative to neutral faces only. To
find the desired specificity, insula activation must be compared with respect
to other emotions as well. Several studies, however, show that upon such
comparisons, one can hardly conclude that insula is specifically a disgust
processor. For instance, Schienle et al. (2002) presented subjects with pic-
tures displaying a wide variety of di↵erent disgust and fear elicitors. The
results show insula activation during the fear condition, and amygdala ac-
tivation during the disgust condition. As the authors remark, the finding
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accords with the notion of the insula as a region involved in a↵ective tasks
without focusing on any specific emotion, a view which is also similar to
Damasios (Damasio et al., 2000) conception of the insula as part of a central
circuit concerned with monitoring emotional states in general.
In addition, although the study by Phillips et al. (1998) showed insula
activation in response to disgust, they also found activation in the insula for
fear, and in the amygdala for disgust. In another study, Stark et al. (2003)
also found amygdala activation during the disgust condition. Besides, similar
brain structures were activated when Stark and colleagues contrasted the
disgusting and fear-inducing pictures with the a↵ectively neutral pictures, a
finding which suggests the idea that fear and disgust are processed in similar
brain structures.
In addition, the link between insula activation and disgust has not been
entirely consistent. For instance, Phillips et al. (1998) didn’t find the insula
or basal ganglia activation in response to auditory disgust stimuli. Fur-
thermore, Schienle et al. ( Schienle, Schfer, Stark, Walter, & Vaitl, 2005)
analyzed data from 63 subjects across four studies to see if the insula, the
amygdala, the orbitofrontal cortex and the medial prefrontal cortex would be
involved in disgust processing. Whereas subjects experienced intense feelings
of disgust (based on a self-report questionnaire), the study found no insular
activation during the disgust conditions.
Moreover, studies show regions other than the amygdala that are involved
in disgust processing. Evidence from several studies (Gorno-Tempini et al.,
2001; Schienle et al., 2006, 2005; Winston et al., 2003) show amygdala ac-
tivation in response to disgust. For instance, in a study by Schienle et al.
(2006), two types of disgust elicitors (pictures of contamination and humil-
iation) were compared with fear-relevant and neutral (scene) stimuli. The
results show that both of the disgust conditions elicited activations in the
amygdala, the occipitotemporal cortex, and the orbitofrontal cortex, but no
significant activation in the insula.
I argued that the insula neither specifically nor consistently responds
during disgust recognition. That is, disgust recognition doesn’t satisfy (1). I
now argue that it doesn’t satisfy (2) either. It is notable that patients with
focal brain damage to the insula or basal ganglia are rare. For a decade, NK
was the only patient with insula and basal ganglia damage whose score on
a disgust experience questionnaire and performance on a disgust recognition
task was lower than controls (Calder, Keane, Manes, Antoun, & Young,
2000). However, it is notable that NK’s poor performance involved processing
of other emotions as well. For instance, during tests of non-verbal emotional
sounds, NK showed a deficit in recognizing surprise and incorrectly labeled
disgust as fear and anger. When interpreting JACFEE facial expressions,
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NK’s recognition of contempt was impaired, and he miscategorized disgust
as anger and contempt. In addition, NK incorrectly categorized disgust facial
expression as anger when the Ekman and Friesen faces were used.
In addition, more recently Straube et al. (2010) reported a patient MK
with a lesion comparable to NK in the insula and basal ganglia. If the insula
and basal ganglia are reliably involved in disgust processing, MK should
show at least some deficits in the processing of disgust stimuli. To examine
MK, Straube and colleagues used tests and methods similar to those used by
Calder et al. (2000) in their study of NK. Contrary to Calder et al.’s findings,
none of the tests by Straube and colleagues on MK revealed a deficit in disgust
processing. Compared to healthy controls, MK showed no impairments in the
recognition or experience of disgust, nor any impairment in the recognition or
experience of other emotions. This finding is corroborated by a more recent
study by Couto et al. (2013) on a patient GG with focal insula damage.
Similar to MK, GG showed no impairment in emotion recognition. The two
studies show preserved disgust experience and recognition despite exclusive
focal damage to the basal ganglia and insular cortex.
Because focal brain damage to the insula and basal ganglia are very infre-
quent, other types of lesion studies might be more illuminating here. Patients
with Huntington’s disease (HD), a neurodegenerative disorder that a↵ects
the basal ganglia and insula, are of primary interest in this area. Indeed, the
primary evidence for the idea that disgust might be processed in a specific
brain structure came from findings in patients with Huntingtons disease,
when Sprengelmeyer and colleagues (R. Sprengelmeyer et al., 1996) found
HD patients showing severe impairments during the facial and vocal motion
recognition tests. However, even in this early study, the average rate at which
disgust was detected was below the next most badly a↵ected emotion, fear.
In addition, the patients had severe problems in discriminating fear from
anger. In general, results from this study show impairments in recognition of
most emotions, with some emotions impaired more than others. In a follow-
up study, Sprengelmeyer et al. (1997) examined emotion recognition at an
individual level in two HD patients, HL and UJ. The results show severe
impairments in the recognition of disgust and fear, but not disgust only, and
one of the patients, UJ, had problems involving the misrecognition of fear as
anger.
Several other findings show that disgust recognition is preserved despite
damage to the basal ganglia or the insula. Milders et al. (Milders, Craw-
ford, Lamb, & Simpson, 2003) compared the performance of HD patients
and gene-carriers of HD on two sets of emotion recognition tests and found
that HD patients were impaired at recognizing several expressions, including
sadness, anger, disgust and fear, compared to healthy controls and asymp-
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tomatic gene-carriers. Interestingly, there was no indication of a selective
impairment in disgust recognition. Indeed, further testing on selective im-
pairment revealed that the patients were in fact significantly more impaired
on other negative emotions, for instance fear, than on disgust. The result
was corroborated by three more emotion recognition studies—one of them on
475 HD patients—that found decline in recognition of all negative emotions,
including sadness, fear, disgust, anger, and surprise (Ille et al., 2011; Johnson
et al., 2007; Snowden et al., 2008). Taken together, the above results show
that disgust recognition fails to satisfy both (1) and (2).
I have shown that the processes involved in experience and recognition of
fear and anger, where simulation theorists have found the best evidence for
neuronal similarity, do now show neural resemblance in the sense required
by the similarity conditions. The result holds not only for fear and anger
but also for other emotions as well, because emotions and sensations are
processed not in specific brain structures as it is claimed, but in an integra-
tive system involving multiple cross-regional interactions in the brain. This
result faces simulation theorists with a conceptual question simulationists
have been struggling with for more than two decades, this time, however, at
low-level mindreading. If emotions are processed in an integrative and dis-
tributed system, how can simulation (at low-level) be characterized in terms
of neuronal similarity? Unless the question is answered, we do not know how
and precisely in what sense emotion recognition is simulational.
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0.4 Why Emotion Recognition Is Not Simulational
Abstract
According to a dominant interpretation of the simulation hypothesis,
in recognizing an emotion we use the same neural processes used in
experiencing that emotion. This paper argues that the view is fun-
damentally misguided. I will examine the simulational arguments for
the three basic emotions of fear, disgust, and anger and argue that
the simulational account relies strongly on a narrow sense of emo-
tion processing which hardly squares with evidence on how, in fact,
emotion recognition is processed. I contend that the current body of
empirical evidence suggests that emotion recognition is processed in
an integrative system involving multiple cross-regional interactions in
the brain, a view which squares with understanding emotion recogni-
tion as an information-rich, rather than simulational, process. In the
final section, I discuss possible objections.
0.4.1 Theory-Theory vs. Simulation Theory
An individual shows the mindreading ability if he or she attributes
mental states to self or others. What kinds of processes and mecha-
nisms underlie mental state attribution in humans? The question has
been central over the last two decades and has given rise to the two
major positions of theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST).
According to TT, mindreading is guided and executed by a theory
of mind, where the term “theory” is variously construed as law-like
generalizations (Churchland, 1981), internally represented knowledge
structure (Stich & Nichols, 1992), or model theories (Godfrey-Smith,
2005; Maibom, 2007, 2009). In more general terms, TT is an account
on which mindreading is understood as an information-rich process.
A typical information-rich style explanation posits a set of mental
representations that contain information about external stimuli, men-
tal states, observable behavior, and the relation among them. How-
ever, the alternative hypothesis, ST, holds we understand others us-
ing our own mind/brain as a model for the other persons mental life.
The mental representations postulated by TT theorists are explanato-
rily redundant because, according to ST, mindreading is achieved by
the operation of purely observation/execution matching mechanisms
(Goldman, 2006; Gordon, 1986; Heal, 1986). Besides, several theo-
rists have developed accounts which take elements of both theory and
simulation (Botterill & Carruthers, 1999; Heal, 1995; Nichols & Stich,
2003; Perner & Kuhberger, 2005).
More recently, simulation theorists have argued that findings from
cognitive neuroscience, specifically the discovery of mirror neurons
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(Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; Rizzolatti,
Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996), are evidence in support of their
position. Mirror neurons are a specific class of neurons that discharge
both when a monkey performs an action and when it observes the
same action by another individual. In addition to motor actions, mir-
ror neurons and mirror processes have been discovered across di↵erent
domains, including the sensation, perception, and emotional response
to pain (Jackson, Meltzo↵, & Decety, 2005; Singer et al., 2004), touch
(Keysers et al., 2004), and disgust (Wicker et al., 2003), among others.
In each case, the brain in its observation mode behaves as if it mirrors
the activity of the brain in its execution/experience mode.5 While
the term “mirroring” technically only refers to an overlap in neuronal
discharge between di↵erent modes of endogenous and exogenous acti-
vation, it has been speculated that the processes underlying mirroring
play a significant role in some cognitive events, such as imitation (Ia-
coboni et al., 1999; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001), empathy
(Decety & Jackson, 2004; Gallese, 2001), and mindreading (Gallese &
Goldman, 1998; Goldman, 2006; Goldman & Sripada, 2005).
Goldman, the most prominent defender of the simulation theory,
has distinguished between low- and high-level mindreading. High-level
mindreading is the partly voluntary and to some degree conscious pro-
cess of detecting propositional states guided by an imagination-driven
form of simulation, whereas low-level mindreading is the automatic
and unconscious detection of emotional states by mirror-based simula-
tion. (Goldman, 2006, p. 43). For low-level mindreading, my focus in
this paper, the best and most extensive pieces of evidence are found in
studies on emotion recognition (Goldman, 2009a, pp. 243–244). So, if
we take simulation as a process P that duplicates or resembles another
process P0 in the target 6 (Goldman, 2006, p. 37), and understand the
relevant respect of resemblance between P and P0 in terms of neuro-
logical similarity 7, what would be the possible simulational account
of a face-based emotion recognition with respect to some emotion E?
On the ST account, people use the same neural system in making a
recognition judgment as is used in experiencing emotion E (Goldman,
2009b, p. 147). That being so, ST predicts that damage to a brain
region responsible for the production of an emotion will also impair
5For a critique of evidence for mirror neurons, see, for example, Dinstein, Thomas,
Behrmann, and Heeger (2008) and Hickok (2009, 2014).
6Note that simulation can be intra-personal or inter-personal. Here we are discussing
third person mindreading and inter-personal simulation.
7P and P0 might resemble each other in at least three di↵erent respects, phenomeno-
logical, functional, and neurological, but the neurological respect is the most promising
one for low-level mindreading. For a discussion, see Goldman (2009b).
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recognition of that emotion. But is there any evidence to support that
emotion experience and recognition co-occur?
Goldman recounts a number of lesion and brain imaging studies in
which the pattern (in its strongest form) emerges in at least three ba-
sic emotions of fear, disgust, and anger. Goldman shows that studies
on both brain-damaged patients and healthy subjects tell us that the
bilateral amygdala is involved both in the experience and recognition
of fear, the insula and basal ganglia are involved in the experience and
recognition of disgust, and dopamine levels are involved in the experi-
ence and recognition of anger. The evidence, Goldman argues, reflects
a systematic relationship between emotion experience and recognition
such that for an emotion E1, there is a region R1 that instantiates both
experience and recognition of E1, and someone impaired in experienc-
ing E1 would be also impaired in recognizing E1. Thus, simulation
is the best explanation for the fact that experiencing an emotion and
recognizing this same emotion depend on the same brain structure
(Goldman, 2006, 2008, 2009b, 2012; Goldman & Jordan, 2013; Gold-
man & Sripada, 2005).
But what would be the possible TT account of emotion recogni-
tion? The paired deficits can also be explained under the TT hypoth-
esis, so long as one of two assumptions holds, both of which, how-
ever, are put into question by Goldman. If, on TT account, emotion
recognition depends on mental representations that map particular
expressions to certain emotions, then one option for TT to explain
the impairments is to assume that experience of an emotion and the
representations involved in recognition of that emotion occur in the
same brain structure. A neural region might be used as a substrate.
It could be the case that a neural region is used both as a neural
substrate for instantiating an emotion and as a substrate for repre-
senting information about that emotion but, Goldman argues, “why
should conceptual representations of fear occur in the same region
[e.g., the amygdala] that underlies fear experience?” (Goldman &
Sripada, 2005, p. 199). An alternative option for TT theorists is to
think of a brain region as a module dedicated to emotion processing in
general. A dedicated region, according to Goldman (Goldman, 2006;
Goldman & Sripada, 2005), does not seem to be an option because
damage to this region would impair recognition of all emotions. If
so, how would TT explain impairment of a specific emotion? I will
discuss Goldman’s argument later but for now the important point is
that Goldman’s simulational account and his argument against TT is
based on the evidence he presents for selective impairments. Goldman
argues that whereas damage to the neural region responsible for emo-
tion E will impair mindreading E, it leaves intact recognition of other
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emotions E0, E00, and so on. Evidence from lesion studies shows that,
these deficits were selective in the sense that patients im-
paired specifically in emotion X had no di culty in recog-
nizing emotion Y or Z but only in recognizing X . . . One
could also formulate the matter in terms of double, indeed
triple, dissociations. Recognition of emotion X can be in-
tact while recognition of Y is impaired, and recognition
of Y can be intact while recognition of X is impaired; and
so forth. (Goldman, 2009b, pp. 145-146)
The selective impairments, according to Goldman, demonstrate that
simulation theory is the best explanation of the fact that experiencing
an emotion and recognizing this same emotion depend on the same
brain structure. Thus, ST is an explanatorily richer hypothesis than
TT, once evidence from cognitive neuroscience is taken into account.
In this paper, I will show that Goldman’s simulational account of
emotion recognition, his arguments against TT, and the idea of selec-
tive impairment behind them, depend on a narrow sense of emotion
processing which involves:
(1) Specificity : that specific brain regions (e.g., the amygdala) be
preferentially active for tokens of one, and only one, emotion category
(e.g., fear).
(2) Consistency : that a region active for an emotion category is
active for every token of that category.
(3) Selectivity : that impairments are selective in the sense that
deficit in a brain region involved in an emotion will impair recognition
of its respective, and only its respective, emotion category.
I will argue that this conception of emotion recognition is funda-
mentally flawed. I will discuss a body of evidence from brain imaging
and lesion studies for three basic emotions of fear, disgust, and anger,
where Goldman’s simulational account has its strongest evidence, and
argue that (1) specific brain regions are involved in instantiating dif-
ferent emotion categories, (2) that for a region that is allegedly specific
to an emotion, inconsistent activations are abundant, and (3) patients
with specific brain lesions reveal several, rather than selective, impair-
ments. The emerging picture suggests that emotions are processed in
multiple integrated and distributed brain structures. This outcome
has two important implications. First, it shows that Goldman’s ac-
count of emotion recognition hardly squares with evidence on how in
fact emotion recognition is processed. Second, it defuses Goldman’s
argument against possible information-rich explanations of emotion
recognition.
Simulation has been hypothesized for several emotions and sensa-
tions, but here I only discuss fear, disgust, and anger, which provide
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the best evidence for the low-level simulation theory. I begin each
section with a brief review of Goldman’s argument for each emotion,
followed by my discussion of that emotion.
0.4.2 Fear and the Amygdala
The first piece of evidence for a selectively paired deficit comes
from studies on fear. In an early study, Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio,
and Damasio (1994) studied a patient SM with bilateral amygdala
damage. When SM was tested in a face-based emotion recognition
task,8 her rating of fearful faces correlated less with normal ratings
than did those of any brain-damaged controls. In addition, other stud-
ies (Adolphs & Tranel, 2000) suggest that SM is also abnormal in her
experience of fear. A di↵erent patient, NM, with bilateral amygdala
damage was studied by Sprengelmeyer and colleagues (1999). Similar
to SM, NM was also abnormal in his experience and recognition of
fear. Goldman maintains that NM was impaired only in fear recog-
nition and that other neuropsychological studies on the amygdala are
broadly consistent with these findings of selectively paired deficits.
The findings altogether, Goldman argues, strongly suggest that nor-
mal people use one and the same neuronal region, the amygdala, in
recognizing fear as they would in experiencing fear. Therefore, fear
recognition is simulational. (Goldman, 2006; Goldman & Sripada,
2005).
However, this analysis leaves out a large body of evidence that
demonstrates that fear recognition does not, in fact, work in the way
that Goldman’s account predicts. First, although a deficit in recogni-
tion of fearful expressions is often observed in patients with amygdala
damage, studies show that the deficit usually impairs recognition of
other emotions as well. For instance, SM rated not only fear but also
expressions of anger and surprise as less intense than did any of the
brain-damaged controls (Adolphs et al., 1994). In a subsequent study
on subjects with unilateral and bilateral amygdala damage, Adolphs
and colleagues (1995) found SM rating surprised and angry faces as
signaling less intense expressions of surprise and anger than did any of
the controls, and all subjects with left amygdala damage rated disgust
and sadness expressions as less intense than did subjects with right
amygdala damage and brain-damaged controls. In other cases with
bilateral amygdala damage, NM showed di↵ering experience of anger
and also di culty in recognition of sadness from facial expressions
8Subjects were shown facial expressions of six basic emotions, as well as neutral faces,
and asked to rate each face according to several emotional adjectives (Adolphs et al.,
1994).
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(Sprengelmeyer et al., 1999), and the patient DR showed impaired
recognition of anger and (to a less extent) disgust (Scott et al., 1997).
NM reported that he rarely experienced fear and anger when asked
about the occurrence of fear and anger in everyday situations. Results
from a subsequent collaborative study on nine subjects with bilateral
amygdala damage showed that the subjects all gave abnormally low
rating scores for most negative emotions (Adolphs et al., 1999).
The view that the amygdala is not specifically a fear processor
can further be supported by evidence from brain imaging studies.
As Sander, Grafman, and Zalla (2003) remark, to show that the
amygdala is specifically involved in fear processing, it needs to be
demonstrated that the di↵erence obtained in the amygdala activation
for fear-inducing stimuli (versus neutral stimuli) cannot be obtained
when comparing amygdala activation for other non-fear-related stim-
uli. However, most brain imaging studies show amygdala activation
for several emotions. In one study, (Blair, Morris, Frith, Perrett, &
Dolan, 1999) the authors scanned 13 normal subjects while subjects
viewed images of faces expressing varying degrees of sadness and anger
while performing a sex discrimination task (responding as to whether
the person whose face they saw was male or female). Blair and col-
leagues found enhanced activity in the left amygdala associated with
increasing intensity of sad and angry facial expressions. In addition,
Whalen and colleagues (2001) found amygdala activation for angry ex-
pressions, and results from an fMRI study (Siegle, Steinhauer, Thase,
Stenger, & Carter, 2002) show amygdala activation to negative, but
not specifically fear-related, information in depressed individuals.
Second, several studies show preserved fear recognition despite uni-
lateral or bilateral amygdala damage. Hamann and colleagues (1996)
report data from two patients, EP and GP, with complete bilateral le-
sions of the amygdala and additional temporal lobe structures. EP and
GP were tested twice, once using the exact material and procedures
reported by Adolphs and colleagues (1994), and again in a slightly dif-
ferent version of the same experiment. Surprisingly, EP and GP rated
normally the same facial expressions that SM (see above) rated ab-
normally. The patients, despite bilateral amygdala damage, appeared
to be unimpaired in recognition of fear or any other emotion category.
Third, studies show that damage to regions other than the amyg-
dala can also result in impairment of fear recognition. For instance,
Adolphs and colleagues (1996) examined 37 subjects with focal brain
damage on a face recognition task and compared their performances
to the mean performance of 15 normal controls. Two findings in this
study are remarkable. First, the study found no recognition impair-
ment in subjects with lesions restricted to left hemisphere. However,
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damage to the right hemisphere was associated with impairments in
emotion recognition. Second, damage to the right anterior infracal-
carine cortex was associated with impairments in fear recognition.
Brain imaging studies also show activation of regions other than the
amygdala during the fear condition. Schienle and colleagues (2002)
found insula activation during the fear conditions. Besides, exami-
nation of emotion processing in patients with obsessive compulsive
disorder shows that fear processing involves multiple regions, includ-
ing the orbitofrontal cortex and the insula (Schienle, Schfer, Stark,
Walter, & Vaitl, 2005a).
Moreover, the link between amygdala activation and fear-inducing
stimuli has not been entirely consistent. Schienle and colleagues (2002)
and Stark and colleagues (2003) obtained no amygdala activation dur-
ing the fear condition. This may suggest that the amygdala is not
even necessary in fear processing. Recent studies by Tsuchiya, Moradi,
Felsen, Yamazaki, and Adolphs (2009) and Piech and colleagues (2010)
on SM found that the patients speed performance on a rapid detection
task of fear-related stimuli was completely normal. This result, as the
authors remark, suggests that the amygdala is not essential, at least
for early stages of fear processing.
Besides these findings, several studies have found a broader role
for the amygdala that involves processing both positive and nega-
tive emotion expressions. For instance, Breiter and colleagues (1996)
found amygdala activation for happy versus neutral faces. In a study
by Garavan, Pendergrass, Ross, Stein, and Risinger (2001), subjects
viewed pictures that varied in emotional content (positive versus neg-
ative valence) while undergoing fMRI scanning. Amygdala activation
was significantly increased for both positively and negatively valenced
stimuli. In an fMRI study, Wright, Martis, Shin, Fischer, and Rauch
(2002) evaluated human brain responses to simple drawings of emo-
tional and neutral facial expressions. Significantly increased fMRI
signals were found in the amygdala in response to angry and happy
schematic faces. Other studies (Kim, Somerville, Johnstone, Alexan-
der, & Whalen, 2003; Wang, McCarthy, Song, & LaBar, 2005) suggest
that amygdala’s role in emotion processing extends to facial expres-
sions of surprise and sadness. Some studies have shown that the amyg-
dala responds across all emotional expression conditions. Yang and
colleagues (2002) examined amygdala responses to the perception of
happy, angry, sad, and fearful facial expressions compared to neutral
expressions. They found that all four facial expressions, including
happy faces, were associated with reliable bilateral activation of the
amygdala. Similarly, in a study by Winston, O’Doherty, and Dolan
(2003), subjects viewed morphed emotional faces displaying low and
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high intensities of disgust, fear, happiness, or sadness under two dif-
ferent task conditions. The amygdala responded to high-intensity ex-
pressions of all the four basic emotions, suggesting that the amygdala
is involved in the perceptual processing of a range of emotions, rather
than fear only. In an fMRI study (Fitzgerald, Angstadt, Jelsone,
Nathan, & Phan, 2006), 20 subjects viewed photographs displaying
fearful, disgusted, angry, sad, neutral, and happy facial expressions.
The left amygdala was activated by each condition separately (emo-
tional or non-emotional) and its response was not selective for any
particular emotion category.
But what can be said about the early finding showing SM’s poor
performance on the fear recognition task? First, it is notable that
although SM exhibited poor performance on recognizing fear from
facial expressions, she could recognize fear from complex visual scenes
and tone of voice. But apart from this, surprisingly, after more than a
decade of study on SM, Adolphs and colleagues (2005) reported that
SM’s impaired recognition stems from her inability to make use of
diagnostic information from the eye region that is normally essential
for recognizing fear, and that this inability is related to her lack of
spontaneous fixation on the eye region of faces. Interestingly, SM’s
recognition of fearful expressions became entirely normal when she was
instructed to look at the eyes. It is also notable that discrimination of
sadness and anger also makes substantial use of the eye region. This
explains why impaired recognition of sadness and anger, along with
fear, has been reported after amygdala damage. Finally, why did SM
appear to be highly selective for fear recognition compared to other
negative emotions? As Adolphs and colleagues (2005) remark, this
is probably attributable to her ability to make compensatory use of
information outside the eye region for those other emotions, a strategy
insu cient with fear recognition.
Taken together, evidence from lesion and functional brain imaging
studies challenge the notion that the amygdala is specialized specif-
ically as a fear processor, and suggest a more general purpose role
which encompasses processing multiple emotions and expressions of
a↵ect. Studies show that the amygdala is involved in processing stim-
uli that are ambiguous, unpredictable, and have particular behavioral
salience (Adolphs, 2008, 2010; Whalen, 2007). Similarly, Sander and
colleagues (2003) suggest that the amygdala is a system with a va-
riety of cortical and subcortical projections that supply information
about the properties of the stimulus as well as the ongoing needs of
the organism. On this account, the amygdala is an evolved system
that acts as a relevance detector, a broader functional category that
is not restricted to fear processing or any specific emotion category.
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Relatedly, Adolphs reminds us that the amygdala is a complex
collection of 13 nuclei extensively connected with many other cortical
and subcortical structures, and thus accounts of its function cannot
do justice to its location unless they put it in a dense web of connec-
tions (2010, p. 42). The connections are so complex that researchers
have even challenged the concept of “the amygdala” as a structural or
functional unit (Swanson & Petrovich, 1998). Taking these points into
account, the emerging picture is a conception of the amygdala that
hardly meshes with Goldman’s view of the amygdala as a distinct and
specific fear processor.
0.4.3 Disgust and the Insula
Unlike the simulational evidence for fear, which was based only on
results from lesion studies, the simulational argument for disgust relies
on two sorts of evidence from both brain imaging and lesion studies,
making disgust “an even clearer case than fear” (Goldman, 2006, p.
117). Goldman reports an fMRI study in which Phillips and colleagues
(1997) obtained insula activation during observation of disgusted fa-
cial expressions such that, he remarks, adjacent regions such as the
amygdala were not activated. In a di↵erent imaging study by Wicker
and colleagues (2003), subjects inhaled odorants producing a strong
feeling of disgust and observed video clips showing facial expression of
disgust. The results by Wicker and colleagues show activation of the
anterior insula and to a lesser extent activation of the anterior cingu-
late cortex in both conditions. Besides, evidence from lesion studies
shows a pattern of a paired deficit in the experience and recognition
of disgust. Calder, Keane, Manes, Antoun, and Young (2000) exam-
ined a patient NK with insula and basal ganglia damage. NK’s score
on a disgust experience questionnaire and performance in the disgust
category of a facial emotion recognition task were lower than controls.
Overall, the findings, according to Goldman’s account, suggest that
the same neural region, the insula, is specifically and selectively re-
sponsible for both experience and recognition of disgust. Therefore,
disgust recognition is simulational (Goldman, 2006; Goldman & Sri-
pada, 2005).
Two points to the contrary of the simulational interpretation of
the Calder and colleagues study and the patient NK are in order.
First, it is notable that although a deficit in disgust processing was
observed in NK, the impairments involved processing of other emo-
tions as well. During tests of non-verbal emotional sounds, NK showed
a deficit in recognizing surprise and incorrectly labeled disgust as fear
and anger, when interpreting JACFEE facial expressions, NK’s recog-
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nition of contempt was impaired, and he miscategorized disgust as
anger and contempt, and for the Ekman and Friesen faces, NK in-
correctly categorized disgust facial expression as anger. These are all
ignored in the simulation argument. Could NK’s impairments result
from a more general deficit in visual processing? This might be the
case especially because Phillips and colleagues (1998) didn’t find insula
or basal ganglia activation in response to presentation of vocal expres-
sions of disgust. Besides, in emotion recognition tests using pictures of
scenes (compared to recognition from faces), NK showed no di culty
at all in recognizing any emotion, including disgust. Given the total
spectrum of findings from these studies, one can hardly think NK’s
impairments result from a deficit in a system specifically involved in
disgust processing.
Second, other studies show preserved disgust experience and recog-
nition in patients with damage similar to NK’s. It is notable that
patients similar to NK are rare, and for a decade NK was the only
patient with focal brain damage to the basal ganglia and insular cor-
tex. Recently, however, Straube and colleagues (2010) have reported
a patient MK with a comparable lesion of the insula and basal gan-
glia. If the insula and basal ganglia are reliably involved in disgust
processing, MK should show at least some deficits in the processing
of disgust stimuli. To examine MK, Straube and colleagues used tests
and methods similar to those used by Calder and colleagues (2000) to
study NK. Contrary to the findings from Calder and colleagues, none
of the tests by Straube and colleagues revealed a deficit in disgust
processing for MK. Compared to healthy controls, MK showed no im-
pairments in the recognition or experience of disgust, nor any notable
impairment in the recognition and experience of other emotions. This
finding is further confirmed by a more recent finding from a study by
Couto and colleagues (2013) on a patient GG with focal insular dam-
age. Like MK, GG showed no impairment in emotion recognition. The
two studies show preserved disgust experience and recognition despite
exclusive focal damage to the basal ganglia and insular cortex.
Because focal brain damage to the insula and basal ganglia is in-
frequent, other types of lesion studies might be illuminating here. Pa-
tients with Huntington’s disease (HD), a neurodegenerative disorder
that a↵ects the basal ganglia and insula, are of primary interest in
this area.9 The primary evidence which inspired the idea that disgust
9Also, two types of psychiatric disorders, obsessive compulsive disorder and Tourette’s
syndrome, are informative in understanding the role of the basal ganglia and the insula
in disgust recognition (see, for example, Calder, Lawrence, & Young, 2001). But here I
confine my discussion only to results from studies on the Huntington’s disease for the sake
of brevity and greater relevance.
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processing might be associated with a specific neural region came from
neuropsychological findings in patients with Huntington’s disease. HD
patients are ignored in Goldman’s account. In an early study, Spren-
gelmeyer and colleagues (1996) found HD patients with severe impair-
ments in disgust processing during facial and vocal emotion recogni-
tion tests. But even in this early study, the average rate at which
disgust was detected was below the next most badly a↵ected emotion,
fear, and in addition, the patients had severe problems in discriminat-
ing fear from anger. The study showed impairment in recognition of
most emotions, with some emotions impaired more than others. In a
follow-up study, Sprengelmeyer and colleagues (1997) further exam-
ined emotion recognition at the individual level in two HD patients,
HL and UJ. The results showed severe impairments in the recognition
of disgust and fear, but not disgust only, and one patient, UJ, had
problems involving the misrecognition of fear as anger.
Several other studies confirm that HD impairments usually involve
recognition of several emotions, rather than disgust only. Milders,
Crawford, Lamb, and Simpson (2003) compared the performance of
HD patients and gene-carriers of HD on two sets of emotion recogni-
tion tests, and found that HD patients were impaired at recognizing
several expressions, including sadness, anger, disgust, and fear com-
pared to healthy controls and asymptomatic gene-carriers. Interest-
ingly, there was no indication of a selective impairment in disgust
recognition. Further testing on selective impairment revealed that the
patients were in fact significantly more impaired on other negative
emotions, for instance, fear, than on disgust. The result was cor-
roborated by three more emotion recognition studies, one on 475 HD
patients, that found a decline in recognition of all negative emotions,
including sadness, fear, disgust, anger, and surprise (Ille et al., 2011;
Johnson et al., 2007; Snowden et al., 2008). Taken together, the data
coming from emotion recognition in HD patients go against the simu-
lational conception of a region as specifically a disgust processor. So
much for the evidence from lesion studies.
Turning now to brain imaging studies, there is much evidence to
suggest that disgust recognition is not, in fact, isolated to a specific
region or network in the brain. First, that the insula is activated,
even consistently, for disgust does not necessarily mean that the in-
sula is specifically a disgust processor. Like what was said about the
amygdala, to show that the insula is specifically a disgust processor,
it must be demonstrated that the di↵erence in activation obtained for
disgust cannot be obtained for other emotion categories. However,
the fMRI studies (Phillips et al., 1997; Wicker et al., 2003) on which
Goldman’s account relies focus exclusively on disgust; they compare
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the insula activation for disgust relative to neutral faces only. But to
find the desired specificity, the insula activation must be compared
with respect to other emotions as well. Several studies, however, show
that, upon such comparison, one can hardly conclude that these re-
gions are specifically disgust processors. For instance, Schienle and
colleagues (2002) presented subjects with pictures displaying a wide
variety of di↵erent disgust and fear elicitors. The results show insula
activation during the fear condition and amygdala activation during
the disgust condition. The finding, as the authors remark, accords
with the notion of the insula as a region involved in a↵ective tasks
without focusing on any specific emotion, a view which is also sim-
ilar to Damasios (Damasio et al., 2000) conception of the insula as
part of a central circuit concerned with monitoring emotional states
in general.
In addition, Phillips and colleagues (1998) found activation in the
insula and basal ganglia for fear, and in the amygdala in response
to disgust.10 In another study, Stark and colleagues (2003) found
significant amygdala activation during the disgust condition. Similar
brain structures were activated when Stark and colleagues contrasted
the disgusting and fear-inducing pictures with the a↵ectively neutral
pictures. The results support the conception that fear and disgust are
processed in similar brain structures.
Second, even the link between insula activation and disgust has
not been entirely consistent. Phillips and colleagues (1998) didn’t
find insula or basal ganglia activation in response to auditory disgust
stimuli. Schienle, Schfer, Stark, Walter, and Vaitl (2005b) analyzed
data from 63 subjects across 4 studies to see if the insula, the amyg-
dala, the orbitofrontal cortex, and the medial prefrontal cortex would
be involved in disgust processing. Whereas subjects experienced in-
tense disgust feelings (based on a self-report questionnaire), the study
found no insular activation during the disgust conditions. This pre-
sumably undermines the notion of the insula as necessarily involved
in disgust processing.
Third, several studies (Hutchison, Davis, Lozano, Tasker, & Dostro-
vsky, 1999; Jackson et al., 2005; Peyron, Laurent, & Garca-Larrea,
2000) show that the insula is involved in pain processing. For instance,
Jackson and colleagues (2005) found that the insula significantly re-
sponds to the perception of painful situations in photographs.11 The
10The number of activated voxels was greater in response to disgust and fear in the insula
and the amygdala, respectively, but the point here is that the regions are not specifically
disgust or fear processors.
11This and other studies show that several regions in addition to the insula are involved
in pain processing, including the anterior cingulate, the cerebellum, and the thalamus.
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findings from this and other studies hardly fit with the conception of
the insula as specifically a disgust processor.
Finally, various findings demonstrate that brain regions other than
the insula and basal ganglia are involved in disgust processing. Ev-
idence from several studies (Gorno-Tempini et al., 2001; Schienle et
al., 2005b, 2006; Winston et al., 2003) show amygdala activation in
response to disgust-inducing stimuli. For instance, Schienle and col-
leagues (2006) compared neural responses of two types of disgust elic-
itors (pictures of contamination and humiliation) with fear-relevant
and neutral scenes. The results show that both disgust conditions
involved activation in the amygdala, the occipitotemporal cortex, and
the orbitofrontal cortex, but no significant activation in the insula.12
Taken together, the above results from brain imaging and lesion
studies speak against the simulational view that a distinct region is
specifically a disgust processor. Instead, the data strongly suggests
that several regions are involved in disgust processing, that insula is
involved in the processing of several emotions, and that disgust and
fear share components of an integrative and distribute system at least
three of which are the insula, the basal ganglia, and the amygdala.
0.4.4 Anger and Dopamine Level
I now briefly discuss Goldman’s argument for a third emotion,
anger. Results from a study by Lawrence and Calder (2004) shows
that dopamine level plays an important role in the experience of
anger in rats and other species, and the study by Lawrence, Calder,
McGowan, and Grasby (2002) suggests that administration of the
dopamine antagonist sulpiride to healthy subjects selectively impairs
facial recognition of anger. These findings, according to Goldman,
demonstrate that the same substrate, dopamine level, is specifically in-
volved in experience and recognition of anger. Therefore, anger recog-
nition is simulational (Goldman, 2006; Goldman & Sripada, 2005).
I point out several problems with this argument. First, findings
show that deficits in anger recognition occur independently of changes
in dopamine levels. As discussed above, subjects with amygdala dam-
age ((Adolphs et al., 1994, 1995; Blair et al., 1999; Scott et al., 1997;
Sprengelmeyer et al., 1999), insula and basal ganglia damage ((Calder
et al., 2000; Sprengelmeyer et al., 1996, 1997), and HD patients (John-
son et al., 2007; Milders et al., 2003; Snowden et al., 2008) show deficits
in anger recognition without being subject to any specific dopamine
12The study by Schienle and colleagues (2006) was an attempt to replicate the data
from a previous study by Wright, Shapira, Goodman, and Liu (2004), who were unable to
image the amygdala with their 3T scanner.
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level manipulation.
Second, the findings by Lawrence and colleagues (2002) are the
result of a single study, not replicated by other studies. Interestingly,
studies show that other pharmacological manipulations can also a↵ect
anger recognition. For instance, the administration of ethanol (Bor-
rill, Rosen, & Summerfield, 1987) and diazepam (Blair & Curran,
1999) impairs anger recognition from facial expressions. Furthermore,
dopamine is involved in other cognitive functions as well, for instance,
its level modulates performance in working memory tasks (Durstewitz
& Seamans, 2002). These findings hardly mesh with the simulational
conception of dopamine level as specifically an anger processor.
Third, simulation is a process that duplicates or resembles another
process (Goldman, 2006, p. 37). Dopamine, however, is a neurotrans-
mitter which is obviously a substance and not a process. Of course,
dopamine might be involved in processes that subserve anger recogni-
tion, but in this case, its role would be too general to be interesting
for the purpose of Goldman’s argument.
Better prospects might be found if an ST advocate looked for a
region, instead of a substance, specifically involved in anger process-
ing. So, like the simulation arguments for fear and disgust, one can
find evidence that, for instance, links anger either to the orbitofrontal
cortex (Blair et al., 1999) or the prefrontal cortex (Monk et al., 2006).
However, from what has been discussed, one can see this position
is hardly viable. It is not hard to find evidence showing that the
orbitofrontal cortex, the prefrontal cortex, or any other possibly rel-
evant region, is neither specifically involved in anger processing, nor
that anger recognition relies solely on one of these possible brain struc-
tures. The pattern we found for fear and disgust holds not only for
anger but for all other emotions and sensations as well; emotion and
sensation recognition occurs in multiple integrative and distributed
brain structures.
0.4.5 Conclusion and Simulationist Response
It is important to recap what we have done so far. The main
purpose of the paper was to examine Goldman’s simulational account
of emotion recognition and his argument against information-rich ex-
planations. On Goldman’s account of emotion recognition, the brain
during emotion recognition duplicates or resembles the brain during
emotion experience such that for an emotion E1, there is a region
R1 that instantiates both experience and recognition of E1. Besides,
deficits in R1 would impair both experience and recognition of E1.
Thus, Goldman concludes, emotion recognition is simulational. How-
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ever, I have shown that a closer examination of the evidence reveals
that the brain during emotion recognition does not resemble the brain
during emotion experience. In other words, the processes that un-
derlie emotion recognition can be dissociated from the processes that
underlie emotion experience. Several studies show that the brain re-
gions Goldman considers as emotion-specific processors are often in-
volved in the processing of several emotions and that the process of
recognizing an emotion occurs in multiple brain structures. In addi-
tion, evidence demonstrates intact emotion experience and recognition
(e.g., fear) despite severe deficit in the allegedly emotion-specific brain
structure (e.g., the amygdala). Therefore, emotion recognition is not
simulational, at least not in the sense intended by Goldman.
Further, Goldman argues that ST has more explanatory power be-
cause TT fails to explain selective impairments—that is, TT fails to
explain why patients impaired in recognizing an emotion E1 have no
di culty in recognizing other emotions E2, E3, and so on (Goldman,
2009b, pp. 145146). However, this argument hinges on the assumption
that each of the basic emotions is specifically processed in a distinct
brain structure. Careful examination of the evidence reveals that the
reported brain regions are not emotion-specific processors. Indeed,
that is why patients diagnosed with a deficit in recognition of an emo-
tion are often impaired in recognition of several emotions. Thus, TT
theorists need not be concerned about selective impairments.
To be clear, I am not denying the relative contribution or signifi-
cance of any brain structure. Certainly, brain imaging studies help to
spot regional changes and identify which brain area is most active for
a certain emotion, but perhaps this identification is not the critical
factor. Instead, as McIntosh (2004) remarks, the contribution of a
brain region, or any neural element, to a mental function depends on
that brain region’s neural context; that is, it depends on the status
of the other anatomically related regions at that point in time (McIn-
tosh, 2004, p. 176). Under this understanding, even Brocas aphasia
should not be attributed simplistically to Brocas area (Shimamura,
2010). Of course, results from brain imaging together with findings
from lesion studies can provide convincing evidence that a region, for
example, the amygdala, contributes to recognition of an emotion, for
example, fear, but the crucial point is that this contribution ought not
be interpreted in the context of brain region specification. Otherwise,
we cannot explain why patients with lesions in specific brain regions
rarely, if ever, have impairment in a single emotion, why a region ac-
tive for an emotion is not active for every instance of that emotion
category, and why specific brain regions respond to more than one
emotion category.
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Advocates of simulation theory would likely object that I have mis-
described the simulational account of emotion recognition. It might
be objected that, while simulation theory is forced to the claim that
the same brain region is used in both experience and recognition of an
emotion, simulation is not committed to the thesis that each emotion
is processed in a distinct brain structure. Why, the objection goes,
cannot a simulationist think that the same brain region is responsible
for di↵erent emotions, but just think that which emotions the brain
area will “produce” depend on a particular pattern of activations. Or,
that all emotions are produced by a unique and identical network of
brain structures, but di↵erent emotions are simply a di↵erent pattern
of activation in this network?
I think this objection is unsuccessful. First, if the same brain re-
gion R, or a network of brain structures, is responsible for di↵erent
emotions, then damage to the region would impair recognition of all
emotions. If so, the simulational account would fail to explain im-
pairment in recognition of a specific emotion. But given the evidence
we have examined, a reasonable way to avoid this problem is just to
abandon the specific and selective impairment stu↵ and admit that
emotion recognition occurs in a network of brain structures. How-
ever, giving up selective impairments does not seem to be an option
for ST, as least not as far as Goldman’s account is concerned. It is
assumed that a process P qualifies as a simulation of P0 only if P du-
plicates or resembles (here in neural terms) P0 in significant respects
(Goldman, 2006, p. 26). But how do the brain processes involved in
emotion recognition duplicate or resemble the processes involved in
emotion experience if emotion recognition is processed by a network
of di↵erent brain structures? If recognition of an emotion E activates
brain regions r1, r2, . . . , rn in a network of brain structures R, then
recognition of E qualifies as simulational only if all (or a significant
part of) the regions in R which are active when recognizing E also
become active when experiencing E. However, this form of similarity
has never been supported by simulation theorists nor to my knowledge
by any independent empirical evidence. But it is notable that even
if we suppose, for the sake of argument, that emotion experience and
recognition occur in multiple, yet similar, brain structures, this form
of similarity fits well with information-rich explanations of emotion
recognition.
It seems we are faced with a dilemma. Either we abandon selective
impairments and believe that emotion recognition occurs in multiple,
but similar, brain structures, in which case we have no empirical evi-
dence to provide backing for this possibility. Or, we stick to the notion
of selective/specific impairment, in which case we will end up with a
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simulational account which hardly squares with empirical evidence on
how, in fact, emotion recognition is processed. Since Goldman’s con-
tributions, several authors have integrated various other contributions
in the spirit of simulation theory. Does the evidence we have reviewed
represent a challenge to these other simulational perspectives? The
answer mainly depends on what we mean by simulation, but, while
we should carefully distinguish between simulation and broader con-
ceptual terms, such as “imitation” and “empathy”13, it is clear that
any simulational account which explains emotion recognition on the
basis of specific, selective, and consistent processing in the brain will
face similar problems.
13We must distinguish between simulation for emotion recognition which involves at-
tributing an emotion to a target from empathy which is simply an emotional contagion
or experience sharing. So, as Goldman remarks, whereas, for example, mirror processes
might be involved in simulation as well as imitation or empathy, the role of mirror neurons
in simulation does not necessarily follow from their role in imitation or empathy (Goldman,
2008, pp. 311–312).
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0.5 Mindreading, Simulation, and Pragmatic
Interpretation
Abstract
Following Grice (1989), pragmatic interpretation is of-
ten seen as an exercise in mindreading. Mindreading
itself, however, has been understood in rather di↵erent
ways. What cognitive mechanisms underpin the min-
dreading exhibited in utterance interpretation? Accord-
ing to one hypothesis, the simulation theory, understand-
ing an utterance is achieved by imaginative projection:
asking what would I have meant by that utterance if I
were in the speakers situation. In the first part of this
paper, I discuss several problems with this view, most
importantly I argue that the simulation strategy is not
only cognitively too demanding but virtually ine↵ective
in utterance interpretation. Next, drawing on empirical
evidence from three clinical populations, I show that, con-
trary to what simulation hypothesis predicts, deficits in
pragmatic interpretation are not associated with simula-
tion impairments, hence simulation cannot play any sig-
nificant role in utterance comprehension.
0.5.1 Introduction
The ability to impute mental states to oneself and others, often
called the theory of mind or mindreading, is fundamental to our so-
cial interaction. However, questions concerning the cognitive basis of
this function continue to be the subject of sustained debate in the lit-
erature (Apperly, 2010; Botterill & Carruthers, 1999; Davies & Stone,
1995a, 1995b; Gallese, 2001; Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Goldman,
2006, 2008; Nichols & Stich, 2003; Josef Perner & Khberger, 2005;
Saxe & Baron-Cohen, 2007; Stich, 2009). Whereas the early debates
on mindreading were set up as a two-sided battle between the two
dominant accounts of Theory- Theory and Simulation Theory, more
recently theorists have more or less realized that mindreading is a
complex phenomenon which, depending on the domain of application,
can be underpinned by theory or simulation. Given this general con-
sensus on the complexity of the phenomenon, the question concerning
the underlying mechanisms of mindreading must be addressed with
respect to the role mindreading ability plays in particular domains
and in connection with di↵erent cognitive functions.
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Of special interest in this respect is the domain of human commu-
nication, in particular, evidence from communication impairments can
be illuminating here. For instance, individuals with autism spectrum
disorder are impaired in verbal and non-verbal communication. Sub-
jects with autism find their social environment incomprehensible and
often treat people and objects alike (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith,
1985, p. 38). But autistic subjects known to be deficient in commu-
nication are also deficient in mindreading. Could this co-occurrence
help in providing a better understanding of communication? In clinical
pragmatics, explanation of communication disorders in terms of min-
dreading deficits has been more dominant than other explanations,
for instance, explanations in terms of inferential load and relevance
processing (Cummings, 2014).
This approach, however, requires we know what kind of mecha-
nisms underlie mindreading. Depending on how we understand min-
dreading, di↵erent implications it has with respect to our understand-
ing of pragmatic impairments. Consider, for instance, the study by
Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) in which they administered a version of the
Wimmer & Perner’s (1983) false-belief test (the acid test for the pres-
ence of mindreading) to three groups of children: a group of 20 autistic
children with relatively high mean IQ of 82, a group of 14 children with
Downs syndrome with an average IQ of 64, and a group of 27 normal
preschool children. Results for Downs syndrome and normal children
were similar: 23 out of 27 (85%) normal subjects and 12 out of 14
(86%) Down syndrome children passed the test. By contrast, 16 out
of 20 (80%) autistic subjects failed the test. Because autistic subjects
had a relatively high IQ, and mentally retarded non-autistic subjects,
subjects with Downs syndrome, are in general socially competent,
one very plausible explanation is to understand autistic impairments
in terms of a di culty in mindreading, rather than to attribute the
impairments to general intelligence. This explanation, of course, ul-
timately depends on how we understand mindreading. However, a
clear understanding of mindreading has proved to be hard to come by.
In the same study, Baron-Cohen proposed that autistic subjects are
impaired in mindreading because the subjects fail to employ a theory
of mind. Similarly, Leslie (Leslie, 1987; Leslie & Frith, 1988) argued
that autistic subjects’ impairments stem from deficits in metarepre-
sentation. However, Gordon (1986) and Goldman (1989), two of the
advocates of the simulation hypothesis, argued that the communi-
cation impairments in autistic subjects of Baron-Cohen study result
from imagination and perspective taking impairments.
Yet there is a trade-o↵ here because, while an account of mindread-
ing helps to explain communication impairments, results from studies
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on communication deficits can provide insight into a better under-
standing of the underlying mechanisms of mindreading. The aim of
the present paper is to use empirical evidence from clinical pragmat-
ics to see if the simulation hypothesis, one of the currently dominant
accounts of mindreading, can account for the mindreading exhibited
in communication, in particular, to evaluate the application of the
simulation hypothesis to the domain of utterance interpretation.
0.5.2 Simulation and Utterance Interpretation
Following Grice (Grice, 1957, 1969, 1975, 1989), there is a general
consensus that our communication does not consist of a sequence of
disconnected remarks, but involves, in addition to linguistically decod-
ing (in verbal communication), the ability of metarepresentation and
expression and recognition of intentions. Non-sentential items such as
flag signals, gestures, facial expressions, and physical postures have
no syntactic structure or component that contribute to the meaning
of the whole. How does a hand wave or a blue flag in yacht racing
mean anything? An expression such as hand wave has a particular
meaning in a communicative context because it is an expression of an
intention mutually recognized by communicators. Even in a verbal
communication, what is meant normally deviates from what is said,
or from conventionally encoded information. The gap between what
is said (linguistically coded information) and what is communicated
cannot be bridged unless communicators engage in a cooperative e↵ort
in which they express and recognize each others mental states. To see
this, consider Mr. A who is a philosopher and is writing a testimonial
about a student. He writes: “Mr. X’s command of English is excel-
lent, and his attendance at tutorials has been regular”. Of course,
Mr. A is implicitly conveying that X is no good at philosophy, but
the reader can recover the implicit meaning only to the extent that
he is able to make certain assumptions about Mr. As mental states.
For instance, that Mr. A knows that the reader expects more infor-
mation than this. The reader knows that Mr. A could not be unable
to provide more information because X is his student. Also, Mr. A
knows that more relevant information than this is required, and also
knows that the reader knows this. The assumptions guide the reader
to notice that Mr. A is reluctant to give more information about X,
which implicates that X is no good at philosophy.
Not only recognition of conversational implicatures but also identi-
fication of explicit content involves metarepresentational competence.
In order to establish what a speaker intends to assert, a hearer must be
able to, for instance, disambiguate and assign a reference, fix the scope
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of quantifiers, resolve the interpretation of vague expressions, and re-
solve illocutionary indeterminacies (Sperber & Wilson, 2002; Wilson,
2005). Whether it is referential ambivalences to resolve, implicatures
to identify, illocutionary indeterminacies to resolve, or metaphors,
ironies or non-sentential expressions to interpret, people in a com-
municative context are deeply involved in spontaneous metarepresen-
tation, either for what they trying to express or in recognizing what
is expressed. But how is the mindreading involved in communication
guided and accomplished? Consider the general pattern of metarep-
resentation in the Gricean schema for identification of conversational
implicatures:
He said that p; . . . he could not be doing this unless he
thought that q; he knows (and knows that I know that
he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he
thinks that q is required; he has done nothing to stop me
thinking that q; he intend me to think, or at least willing
to allow me to think, that q; and so he has implicated
that q (Grice, 1989, p.31).
The working-out scheme can be described adequately as an exercise
in reflective reasoning in which expression and recognition of com-
municative intentions involve the application of inferential abilities to
rules, generalizations, or concepts of a theory of mind. Details on
the nature of these generalizations and the theory are not important
here. What matters is that according to this view utterance interpre-
tation is an inferential and thoroughly metarepresentational process
in which either a general theory of mind is applied to the domain of
communication or alternatively a specialized theory of mind module
is dedicated for use in the domain of communication.
The above approach to mindreading, often under the label of theory-
theory, has been the dominant explanatory strategy in understanding
a wide range of cognitive functions, including among the first the
ability to comprehend linguistic behavior (Stich & Nichols, 1992).
However, there is an alternative approach to mindreading, called the
simulation theory, according to which we understand others by using
our own mind as a model for others’ mental life. The basic idea of
the simulation hypothesis is well expressed in a study by Kahneman
and Tversky (1981) in which participants were asked to consider two
travelers, Mr. Crane and Mr. Tees, who were scheduled to leave the
airport on di↵erent flights, at the same time. They traveled from town
in the same limousine, which was caught in a tra c jam, and arrived
at the airport 30 minutes late. Mr. Crane is told his flight left on time.
Mr. Tees is told that his flight was delayed, and just left 5 minutes ago.
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Who do you think is more upset? 96% of subjects said that Mr. Tees
was more upset. How did they come up with this answer? On a simu-
lationist account, “each subject would have put himself in each of the
imaginary travelers shoes and have imagined he would have felt in that
place” (Gallese & Goldman, 1998, p. 496). Likewise, Gordon (1986)
argues that in understanding and predicting behavior, we simulate by
answering the question “what would I do in that person’s situation?”.
We, Gordon remarks, imaginatively project into the other’s situation
in the same way chess players do when playing against an opponent.
Chess players, while “transformed in imagination”, visualize the board
from the other side and act accordingly.
While the above cases express the core idea of the simulation hy-
pothesis, simulation theorists have provided more details on how sim-
ulational processes are executed. On a typical understanding of the
simulation hypothesis, simulation is a process in which we understand
others by imaginatively replicating a target’s mental states, that is,
by imaginatively generating states that stand as representational sur-
rogates for those of the target. The imaginatively generated states,
or pretend states, are then fed into mindreader’s own mental mecha-
nisms, for example into the decision-making system which momentar-
ily operates ‘o↵-line’(i.e. disengaged from its standard operations). In
the final stage, an output is generated and attributed to the target.
In Gordon’s words, during simulation,
Our decision-making or practical reasoning system gets
partially disengaged from its ‘natural’inputs and fed in-
stead with suppositions and images (or their ‘subpersonal’or
‘sub-doxastic’counterparts). Given these artificial pre-
tend inputs the system then makes up its mind what to
do. Since the system is being run o↵-line, as it were,
disengaged also from its natural output systems, its ‘de-
cision’isn’t actually executed but rather ends up as an
anticipation. . . of the other’s behaviour. (Gordon, 1986,
p.170)
This simulational strategy has been used to account for mindreading
in di↵erent domains, including decision prediction (Goldman, 1989;
Gordon, 1986), figuring out solutions to arithmetic questions (Heal,
1995), inference prediction (Stich & Nichols, 1995), and predicting
the grammaticality judgments (Harris, 1992). How about compre-
hending linguistic behavior in intentional terms? Here again, simula-
tion theorists deny any substantial role for a theory or such internally
represented knowledge structure in understanding linguistic behavior.
Goldman (1989) argues:
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Verbal communicators commonly make assumptions. . .My
question is: how does a communicator proceed to esti-
mate what pieces of information will be marshaled, or
made salient, in the mind of the audience. . . The speaker
cannot appeal to any such theoretical knowledge to make
predictions of what is likely to be derived or calculated
by the hearer. Nonetheless, speakers are evidently pretty
good at making such predictions, more precisely, at pre-
dicting what kinds of ‘implicatures’, will be appreciated
by an audience. How do they do that? Again, I suggest,
by simulation. (Goldman, 1989, p.171-2)
Similarly, Currie & Ravenscroft maintain:
Understanding a speaker’s meaning where it di↵ers from
the meaning of what is said is a plausible candidate for
something one would do by imaginative projection. . . Putting
yourself in the speaker’s shoes and asking ‘What would I
have meant by that?’ would be a good way to solve the
problem. (Currie & Ravenscroft, 2002)
But how the simulation strategy can explain the mindreading ex-
hibited in communication, in particular in utterance interpretation?
One di culty with this suggestion is that the simulation hypothesis
has been often used to account for mindreading in predictive cases:
action prediction, decision prediction, inference prediction, grammati-
cality judgment prediction etc. Predictions, however, proceed by mov-
ing forward. For example, in action prediction, one proceeds forward
from imaginatively generated (pretend) mental states, runs the states
through his own decision-making system, and predicts the possible ef-
fect (an action) of those mental states. But an utterance is a generated
piece of action that requires explanation. Unlike predictions, explana-
tions are achieved by moving backward from an observed action to the
mental states that have resulted in that action. Can simulation run
backward? If it does, does it work in utterance interpretation too?
It is argued that simulation can be involved in both predictive and
retrodictive cases. How does retrodictive simulation work? Retrodic-
tive, or backward, simulation requires figuring out what mental states
did the target have that led him to that action. To achieve this, he
simulator imagines himself in the target’s situation and conjectures
possible mental states that could have caused the observed action.
Retrodictive simulation was first proposed in motor domain (under-
standing observable motor movements) by Gallese & Goldman (1998)
and others (Fogassi et al., 2005; Iacoboni et al., 2005). But how,
exactly, does the process could work in utterance interpretation? A
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more elaborate account of backward simulation has been o↵ered by
Goldman (Goldman, 2006; Goldman & Sripada, 2005) in his model of
“generate and test” strategy:
The “generate” stage produces hypothesized states or state
combinations that might be responsible for the observed
(or inferred) evidence.. . . The “test” stage consists of try-
ing out one or more of the hypothesized state combina-
tions to see if it would yield the observed evidence.. . . One
E-imagines being in the hypothesized combination of states,
lets an appropriate mechanism operate on them, and sees
whether the generated upshot matches the observed up-
shot. (Goldman, 2006, p.184)
On the generate and test model, to understand an action we gener-
ate one or more hypotheses about the mental states that might be
responsible for that action. To test the hypotheses, we imaginatively
pretend to be in the hypothesized mental states, then run them one
at a time through our own decision-making system to see which one
results in an output (action) that matches the observed action.
Several problems with the generate and test model arise immedi-
ately. To begin with, the generate-and-test strategy is not a purely
simulational process. The generation of hypothesized mental states, as
the possible cause of actions, relies on generalizations (a theory) about
connections between particular actions and certain mental states that
cause them. Without such generalizations, the ‘generate’ stage would
never get o↵ the ground. Suppose, as Goldman has noted, that
the ‘generate and test’ strategy is a hybrid account that consist of
a theory-driven stage (hypothesis generation) followed by a purely
simulational mechanism (testing stage). Even so, there remains sev-
eral di culties to worry about, perhaps the most obvious being that
understanding in terms of the generate and test strategy results in
duplication of the target behavior. According to the generate and test
strategy, understanding an action requires generating hypotheses that
in order to be tested a replica of the target action must be generated:
the mindreader’s cognitive mechanism is provided with inputs, and
next the output of the system is tested against the target action. If
the generated output matches the target action, the hypothesis is ver-
ified and so simulator can make sense of the target action. However,
whereas the generate and test might be the mechanism that operates
in understanding certain emotions, for example, when observation of
a disgusted facial expression results in similar feeling or facial expres-
sion in the observers (Wicker et al., 2003), this is not what happens
when we understand others’ actions: we do not understand actions by
replicating observed actions.
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Second, and relatedly, the generate and test strategy runs counter
to the standard understanding of the simulation hypothesis. On the
standard simulation, the practical reasoning system is taken ‘o↵-line’—
that is, momentarily disengaged from its natural inputs and outputs—
and the inputs are imaginative and ‘tagged’ as belonging to the target.
That is why simulation, under the standard understanding, never re-
sults in duplication or execution of simulated action, as it normally
does in its usual operation, but instead returns an output (mental
states) that is attributed to the target (for an overview of the simu-
lation hypothesis, see Goldman, 1989, 2006; Gordon, 1986; Nichols &
Stich, 2003). Contrary to the standard understanding, hypothesized
mental states in the generate and test strategy result in generating
an action which is then compared to the target action. The problem
is that, either the simulating system runs o↵-line, in which case the
generate and test strategy fails to accomplish action understanding
because no action is produced that can be tested to understand the
target action. Or, simulation operates on genuine inputs and returns
an action output, but this results in duplicating actions and this is
not what actually happens when we understand actions.
There are also other problems with the simulation hypothesis. The
generate and test strategy is not only cognitively too demanding and
impractical (generating and testing actions every time we make sense
of an action), it is also virtually ine↵ective in communication. As dis-
cussed above, utterances and non-verbal behavior often greatly under-
determine what is communicated. To establish the speaker’s meaning,
there are indeterminacies that must be observed, including recognition
of implicatures and other disambiguates. How does the generate and
test strategy can bridge the gap between what is said and what is
communicated? Perhaps simulation could be the possible strategy if
there were one-to-one relations between actions and mental states,
such that for any action there was a specific set of mental states that
could give rise to that action. This clearly is not the case because the
same action can be motivated by di↵erent intentions and there may be
more than one interpretation for the same action. Besides, listing all
possible interpretations does not seem to be an option because then
again there must be a highly theoretical mechanism that selects, from
a range of possible interpretations, the most relevant interpretation,
the one that can be tested (in the test stage of simulation) and sounds
as the best explanation of the target action.
An advocate of simulation might argue that cognitive load of the
testing stage is facilitated by the range of possible actions constrained
by previous experience and practicalities. However, that does not
sound too promising because, while ordinary actions might be a re-
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iteration of previous actions, many linguistic actions are wholly new.
As Sperber and Wilson (2002) remark, the prior probability of most
utterances ever occurring is close to zero. Thus, whereas the semantic
complexity of ordinary intentions is limited by the relatively limited
range of possible actions, there are no such limitations on the semantic
complexity of speakers intentions (Sperber & Wilson, 2002, p. 17).
Still, some theorists might object that understanding simulation
in terms of ‘the generate and test strategy’ or ‘o↵-line simulation’ is
too narrow and constraining. Besides, not all simulation theorists
argue for o↵-line simulation. Harris (1992) and Heal (1996) defend
a version of simulation in which nothing corresponds to the o↵-line
operation. Similarly, Currie & Ravenscroft (2002), while keeping the
notion of imaginative inputs, have abandoned the idea of o↵-line op-
eration, arguing that the whole notion of bringing the system o↵-line
is problematic because it is an obvious fact that people are able to do
mind-reading tasks while performing other actions (Currie & Raven-
scroft, 2002, p. 70). It might be argued that, while simulation in its
narrower sense faces certain di culties, simulation under a broader in-
terpretation is the strategy we adopt in utterance interpretation. So,
whereas hypothesis generation and hypothesis testing might be some-
how involved in backward simulation, neither are crucial in utterance
interpretation because, the argument goes, simulation for mindreading
is a species of mental simulation in general (Goldman, 2006) and this
general sense of mental simulation essentially consists in the ability of
perspective taking, the ability of placing oneself in imagination in the
target’s situation and (retrodictively) see what that action mean.
This broader sense of simulation is close to Gordon (1986), Harris
(1992), and Heal’s (1996) conception of simulation. This conception
of simulation is also advocated by other simulation theorists. For
instance, Currie & Ravenscroft (2202) have argued that during simu-
lation it is only the perspective taking part that is, properly speaking,
simulation (Currie & Ravenscroft, 2002, p.54). Also, Goldman’s re-
cent work on high-level mindreading characterizes simulation in terms
of the general ability of enactment imagination, visual perspective
taking, visualization and motor imagery (Goldman, 2006, 2008, 2012;
Goldman & Jordan, 2013). This is nicely illustrated in an example by
Goldman:
I am planning tonight’s dinner. I just purchased a white
beans and artichoke salad, which might nicely combine
with a bed of leafy greens already in the refrigerator. To
test the appeal of this combination, I visualize the white
beans and pale green artichoke hearts against the back-
ground of the dark green (and red) leafy ingredients. This
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act of visual imagination is an instance of E-imagination.
(Goldman, 2006, p. 149)
Visual and imaginative perspective taking, as Baron-Cohen remark,
requires primary (first-order) representations only and “can be per-
formed using the strategy of mental rotation on primary representa-
tions” (Baron-Cohen, 1988, p. 394). If simulation in this broader sense
is the mechanism that is responsible for mindreading in utterance in-
terpretation, then deficits in perspective taking must be associated
with pragmatic impairments. In the next section of the paper, I ar-
gue that empirical evidence from di↵erent clinical populations speak
against this association.
0.5.3 Dissociation Between Pragmatic impairments and Sim-
ulation Deficits
Communication impairments are among the key symptoms of autism
spectrum disorder. The literature reveals a severely impaired function-
ing on all pragmatic aspects in autistic subjects, including di culties
in using speech acts (Ziatas, Durkin, & Pratt, 2003), comprehend-
ing irony and metaphor (Gold, Faust, & Goldstein, 2010; Martin &
McDonald, 2004), detecting violations of Gricean Maxims (Surian,
Baron-Cohen, & Van der Lely, 1996) and using features of context in
utterance interpretation (Loukusa et al., 2007) (cited in Cummings,
2013, 2014). There is also clear evidence of mental state attribu-
tion impairments in autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Golan, Baron-
Cohen, & Golan, 2008; Leslie & Frith, 1988; D. Williams & Happ,
2010; D. M. Williams & Happ, 2009). However, subjects with autism,
despite communication deficits, do not seem to have di culties in
simulation, that is, su↵ering from limited imagination or di culties in
perspective taking.
Empirical research on whether autistic subjects are particularly
susceptible to perspective taking impairments was first started by
Hobson (1984). In one test, called ‘seek-and-hide’, subjects were pre-
sented a display which included hiding holes, a figure wishing to hide,
and seekers. In a second test, the cube test, participants were re-
quested to figure out the perspective of a doll, but in order to do so,
they needed to recognize the relevance of points of view very di↵erent
from their own. Results, as Hobson reports, show no deficiency in the
ability to identify another subject’s perspective, nor any di culty to
coordinate di↵erent perspectives in the cube game. The autistic par-
ticipants performed as well as the comparison groups on both tasks.
In a subsequent study, Leslie & Frith (1988) presented autistic chil-
dren with a scene in which a plastic board was placed on a table such
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that a doll could be on either side of the board (visible to the child).
Next, a counter was introduced and placed on the board. Depending
on the position of the counter in relation to the doll, the child was
asked whether the doll could see the counter. In other trials, the ex-
perimenter varied the position of the doll while the child was asked to
change the position of the counter where the doll could or could not
see it. All of the participants passed the test, a result suggesting that
subjects with autism have no di culty to visualize the line of sight
regardless of their ability to understand mental states.
Using a di↵erent paradigm, Baron-Cohen (1989) examined visual
perspective taking in autistic subjects compared to the ability of nor-
mal subjects and subjects with Down’s Syndrome. Small toys were
placed around the subject and, from the orientation of an experi-
menter’s eyes alone, the subject had to identify which toy the exper-
imenter is attending to. The results show no significant di↵erences
within or between the three groups: 92.5% of autistic subjects, 94.4%
of normal subjects, and 89.3% of subjects with Down Syndrome passed
the test. This finding was replicated in a study by Leekam and col-
leagues (1997). Using the same procedure, Leekam et al. (Leekam,
Baron-Cohen, Perrett, Milders, & Brown, 1997) compared the per-
formance of autistic subjects relative to the performance of normal
subjects and subjects with Down’s Syndrome, and found no signifi-
cant group di↵erences.
The above finding all point in the direction of an intact capability
of visual perspective taking, that individuals with autism can imagi-
natively understand that they and others might have a di↵erent line of
sight, that what things others do and do not see at any given moment.
This is what Flavell (1977) calls the ability of level-1 visual perspec-
tive taking. While the above results demonstrate that visualization in
autism is intact, the mindreading exhibited in communication requires
more than level-1 perspective taking. In addition to that, communi-
cation requires the ability of understanding that others may represent
the same thing a bit di↵erently than they do and thus might have
a di↵erent perspective on the same thing. This is the ability Flavell
(1977) called level-2 perspective taking.
Reed & Peterson (1990) examined both level-1 and level-2 perspec-
tive taking in autism. For level-2 perspective taking task, Reed and
Peterson examined subjects’ understanding of contrasting perspec-
tives of individuals viewing the same object from di↵erent vantage
points. The subjects sat in front of a turntable and an object (a plas-
tic tiger or a teddy bear) was placed on the turntable. Participants
were instructed to “turn it round so I can see the —” the last word
being “nose,” “tail,” “back,” depending on the object presented (Reed
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& Peterson, 1990, p. 460). The authors report a uniformly high-level
performance by all subjects on both level-1 and level-2 perspective tak-
ing task, with no significant di↵erence in performance between autistic
and control groups. Similarly, Tan & Harris (1991) found autistic sub-
jects performing as well as normal controls on both level-1 and level-2
perspective taking tasks.
To examine visuospatial perspective taking in subjects with As-
perger syndrome (autistic subjects with higher than average intel-
lectual abilities), David et al. (2010) asked participants to detect
an elevated object from a virtual character’s point of view: “which
object is elevated from his perspective?” Besides, participants went
through an introductory session in which they were instructed to an-
swer the questions by using imagination: “imagine yourself standing
in the position of the virtual character”; “it is important to imagine
your change in position!”. David et al. report no significant group
di↵erences in perspective taking. The ability to spontaneously adopt
visuospatial perspective in autism was also examined in a study by
Zwickel et al. (Zwickel, White, Coniston, Senju, & Frith, 2011). A
dot appeared next to a triangle protagonist, and participants were
asked to press either the left or right button to indicate on which side
of the screen the dot appeared relative to the triangle. On congruent
trails, a dot appeared on the same side from the viewpoint of both
the triangle and the observer, whereas on incongruent trials the dot
occurred while the triangle was pointing downwards so a dot on the
participant’s right fell on the left of the triangle or vice versa. The
results, as Zwickel et al. remark, were clear cut: subjects with autism
and control participants displayed the same result, suggesting that
spontaneous perspective taking in autism is intact.
Results regarding level-2 perspective taking have not always been
consistent. Yirmiya et al. (Yirmiya, Sigman, & Zacks, 1994) presented
autistic subjects with items on a rotating table. The task required the
participants to turn the table until they can see an item in the exact
same way that the experimenter can see the item from where she is
standing. The majority of autistic subjects showed good perspective
taking ability, but as a group, they performed less well than the nor-
mally developing children. However, the authors remark that the poor
performance might be a↵ected by the heavy memory demands of the
test. So, poor performance in some cases may represent a di culty in
executive function than impairments in perspective taking. A study
by Reed (2002) shows how, at least in some cases, deficits in executive
function can explain poor performance in perspective taking.
Also, Hamilton et al. (Hamilton, Brindley, & Frith, 2009) com-
pared the performance of autistic subjects on level-2 perspective tak-
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ing to performance on a mental rotation task in a group of low-
functioning children with autism. Both tasks began with the same
experimental design: a toy placed on a turntable and the child was
given a laminated card showing four pictures of the toy taken from
di↵erent perspectives. For mental rotation trials, the toy was covered
with an opaque flower pot, and the experimenter turned the table
through 90°clockwise, and 180°and 90°counter clockwise. Then the
child was asked, “when I lift the pot, which panda will you see?”. For
visual perspective taking task, the toy was covered and small doll,
named Susan, was placed on di↵erent sides of the table and the child
was asked: “this is Susan. When I lift the cover, which Panda will
Susan see?”. The results show that participants with autism have di -
culties with level-2 visual perspective taking compared to their special
rotation abilities. However, even the mental rotation task requires the
subjects be able to imagine the rotation of the toy on the turntable.
Other sorts of evidence may help to resolve discrepant findings.
One line of evidence comes from studies on first-person mindread-
ing. If simulation is the mechanism that underlies mindreading—so
subjects with autism have communication di culties because they
are impaired in perspective taking—then, as Carruthers (2006) has
pointed out, on the assumption that introspective faculty is intact in
autism, it should be expected that autistic subjects have no di culty
in reading their own minds. Several studies, however, speak against
this assumption.
Phillips et al. (Phillips, Baron-Cohen, & Rutter, 1998) tested
autistic subjects on an intention reporting task. The task was based
on a target-shooting game in which the subjects’ aim was to get as
many prizes as possible by shooting down the cans with the prizes
inside. Subjects had to choose a color to shoot, but before shooting
a corresponding colored card was placed in front of the subject to re-
mind the color he is shooting. Further, the test was designed in a way
that the experimenters could manipulate the desirability of some out-
comes, to make them intentional but not desirable, or desirable but
accidental. As a result, some intended outcomes were not rewarded
with a prize, and some accidental outcomes did contain a prize. Af-
ter obtaining a prize, the subjects were asked “Which color did you
mean to shoot? The (red) one or the (yellow) one?” The results show
that when there was a discrepancy between intention and outcome
(intended but not desirable or vice versa), subjects with autism per-
formed much poorer than controls on reporting their intention, show-
ing that subjects with autism hardly can discriminate between their
intended and non-intended actions. In a more recent study, Williams
& Happ (2010) assessed the explicit awareness children with autism
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have of their own intentions. In experiment 1, participants awareness
of their own knee-jerk reflex movements was assessed. Compared to
controls, autistic subjects were significantly less accurate in reporting
their reflex movements as unintentional. In experiment 2, the Trans-
parent Intention task, participants with autism were less able than
controls to recognize their mistaken action as unintended.
Using experience sampling method, Hurlburt et al. (Hurlburt,
Happ, & Frith, 1994) studied introspection in three adult subjects
with Asperger’s syndrome. Subjects carry a small device that pro-
duces a beep at random intervals which the subject hears through
an earphone. The subjects were instructed to freeze the content of
their experience at the moment they hear the beep and then write
down some notes about the details of that experience. Results by
Hurlburt et al. show that one of the subjects, Peter, was unable to
think and talk about his inner experience. The other two subjects also
performed impressively di↵erent from normal controls, reported their
thoughts purely in terms of images with almost no other features of
experience such as emotional feelings.
Kazak et al. (Kazak, Collis, & Lewis, 1997) examined the under-
standing that subjects with autism have of their own knowledge state
and that of another person and found no evidence showing that re-
ferring to ones own mental states in autistic subjects is easier than
recognizing another persons mental states. Using a paradigm often
labeled as unexpected content, Perner et al. (Perner, Frith, Leslie,
& Leekam, 1989) presented autistic subjects with a typical box of a
certain brand of sweets (Smarties), but to their surprise, the box con-
tained something else (pencils). When asked about what they knew
about the content of the box, the subjects had di culty in report-
ing what they had wrongly predicted (Smarties) at the beginning of
the experiment. In a more recent study, Williams et al. (Williams &
Happ, 2009) devised an unexpected content task, the Plasters’ task,
in which the experimenter pretended that he had cut his finger and
asked the participants if he could get him a plaster by pointing to the
containers. The participants unexpectedly found that the plaster box
contained birthday cake candles. Once discovered the actual content
of the box, the participants were asked the Self-test question (“Before
you looked in the tube, what did you think was inside?”), and the
Other-person test question (“Later on I am going to show this tube to
your teacher. He/she hasnt seen inside here though. What will he/she
think is in there before he/she looks inside?”). The results show that
autistic subjects have significant di culty in reporting their prior false
belief than to predict the false belief of another person.
The pattern we found in autism, that is, the dissociation between
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communication deficits and perspective taking impairments, is also
found in at least two other clinical populations with pragmatic disor-
ders: patients with schizophrenia and fragile X syndrome.
Compared to subjects with mixed anxiety-depression and subjects
with hemispheric brain damage, individuals with schizophrenia exhibit
a high degree of inappropriate pragmatic abilities (Meilijson, Kasher,
& Elizur, 2004). The impairments include proverb comprehension
(Brne & Bodenstein, 2005), di culties in processing contextual in-
formation (Bazin, Perruchet, Hardy-Bayle, & Feline, 2000; Sitnikova,
Salisbury, Kuperberg, & Holcomb, 2002) and recognition of commu-
nicative intentions. Tnyi et al. (Tnyi, Herold, Szili, & Trixler, Jan-
uary February) presented patients with schizophrenia and normal con-
trol subjects with ‘question and answer’ vignettes, where the Gricean
maxim of relevance was violated to communicate a hidden meaning.
The findings show that schizophrenic patients fail to recognize the in-
tentional violation of the Gricean maxim, a di culty in understanding
conversational implicatures. But Schizophrenic patients are also im-
paired in mental state attribution. Corcoran et al. (Corcoran, Cahill,
& Frith, 1997) presented schizophrenic patients with two sets of car-
toon jokes, the first set could be understood on the basis of purely
physical and semantic analysis, while understanding the other set re-
quired participants to recognize the character’s mental states in order
to ‘get’ the joke. The patients had considerable di culty to under-
stand the jokes. Other studies also demonstrate di culties in mental
state attribution in schizophrenic patients (Bora, Yucel, & Pantelis,
2009; Brne & Bodenstein, 2005; Frith & Corcoran, 1996; Langdon et
al., 1997).
However, subject with schizophrenia, similar to subjects with autism,
do not seem to have di culty in perspective taking. Langdon et al.
(Langdon, Coltheart, Ward, & Catts, 2001) examined the visual per-
spective taking in schizophrenic subjects and normal controls. Par-
ticipants were presented with arrays of colored blocks on a stand or
a turntable and were asked two sets of questions. ‘Item’ questions
(asking locations of array-features) and ‘appearance’ questions (asking
how an array appear from another perspective), each type of question
paired with viewer rotation instructions (asking subjects to imagine
moving themselves relative to an array) and array-rotation instruc-
tions (asking subjects to imagine rotating an array relative to their
fixed viewpoint). The results show that patients made more errors
than controls only when judging appearance question, but performed
as well as controls and with the same accuracy when judging all other
questions.
Pragmatic impairments are also found in subjects with fragile X
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syndrome. Specific pragmatic disturbances are observed in individ-
uals with fragile X syndrome, including use of repetitive language
(utterance repetition, topic repetition, and conversational device rep-
etition) (Ferrier, Bashir, Meryash, Johnston, &Wol↵, 1991; Murphy &
Abbeduto, 2007), and failure to signal non-comprehension language as
a listener (Abbeduto et al., 2008). Subjects with fragile X also show
di culty in mental state attribution (Cornish et al., 2005; Garner,
Callias, & Turk, 1999; Grant, Apperly, & Oliver, 2007). However,
fragile X subjects do not appear to have di culty with perspective
taking (Mazzocco, Pennington, & Hagerman, 1994; Mazzocco & Reiss,
1999).
So, to recap: simulation is not the mechanism responsible for the
mindreading exhibited in communication for two reasons. First, not
only simulation would be cognitively too demanding and impracti-
cal but also virtually ine↵ective in pragmatic interpretation. Second,
as evidence from three clinical populations of autism, schizophrenia,
and fragile X syndrome revealed, while there is an association between
di culties in mental state attribution and pragmatic deficits, perspec-
tive taking impairments and pragmatic deficits are dissociated. Thus,
pragmatic comprehension cannot be simulational.
If pragmatic interpretation is not simulational, what is it then?
This paper is not primarily intended to answer this question. How-
ever, despite the simulational proposals for utterance interpretation,
most theorists working in pragmatics see utterance interpretation as a
variety of mindreading and see mindreading itself guided and achieved
either by a general-purpose inferential process (which operates during
both utterance interpretation and other cases of mindreading) or by
a module dedicated to the domain of utterance interpretation. Grice
himself thought that utterance comprehension is an inferential pro-
cess in which expression and recognition of communicative intentions
are achieved by several levels of metarepresentation and application
of a psychological theory (that is, the Gricean maxims and Coop-
erative Principle). Other theorists even have gone one step further
arguing that the gap between what is said and what is communicated
is so great that there is no way of establishing communicative inten-
tions without a specialized module dedicated to utterance comprehen-
sion (Sperber & Wilson, 2002; Wilson, 2005). Now, while simulation
might be the mindreading mechanism in other domains, for instance
in recognition and attribution of emotions and sensations (Goldman,
2006; Goldman & Sripada, 2005) 14, given the cognitive complexity of
mindreading exhibited in utterance comprehension and the empirical
evidence we reviewed, simulation cannot be responsible for utterance
14For a critique of the role of simulation in emotion recognition, see (Yousefi Heris, 2017)
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interpretation and prospects for a viable simulational account in this
domain do not seem so promising.
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0.6 Willing, Intending, Metarepresenting: Weak-
ness of Will Psychologized
Abstract
Philosophers have always treated weakness of will as act-
ing against one’s best judgment. But more recently Holton
has suggested that weakness of will is agents failure to per-
sist in resolutions. However, precisely what resolutions
are and what forming resolutions cognitively involves are
left rather underdescribed in Holton’s account. In this
paper, I first briefly clarify the concept of resolution and
show that having a resolution involves the capacity of
metarepresentation and intention recognition. This will
provide a framework for a more natural and empirically
oriented account of weakness of will. Next, I present sub-
stantial evidence from developmental psychology which, I
argue, demonstrates that weakness or strength of will is
essentially an exercise in metarepresentation.
0.6.1 Weakness of Will
An agent’s action reveals weakness of will if he acts freely and in-
tentionally counter to his own assessment of the action. In Davidson’s
words, in doing x an agent acts incontinently if and only if:
(a) the agent does x intentionally; (b) the agent believes there
is an alternative action y open to him; and (c) the agent judges
that, all things considered, it would be better to do y than to do
x. (Davidson, 1970, p. 22)
Condition (a) requires that the action is done consciously and delib-
erately. Condition (b) requires that the agent does the action from a
range of options open to him at the time and so is doing that action
freely. Condition (c) requires that the agent’s overall assessment of
the options open to him speak against doing x.
For centuries, this has been the dominant understanding of weak-
ness of will in the philosophical literature. Philosophers have reacted
to this picture in two di↵erent ways. Plato’s Socrates, for instance,
denied the possibility of weak-willed actions:
no one who knows or believes there is something else bet-
ter than what he is doing, something possible, will go on
doing what he had been doing when he could be doing
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what is better. To give in to oneself is nothing other than
ignorance, and to control oneself is nothing other than
wisdom. (Protagoras, 358c)
Similarly, according to the moral philosopher R. M. Hare (1952),
it is impossible for a person to act freely and intentionally against his
moral judgment because value-judgments, if they are action-guiding,
entail first-person commands or imperatives. On Hare’s account, “it
becomes analytic to say that everyone always does what he thinks
he ought to” provided he is physically and psychologically able to do
so (Hare, 1952, p. 169). Other philosophers, however, have tried to
vindicate the possibility of weakness of will. For instance, Davidson
(1970) holds that “there is no proving such actions exist; but it seems
to me absolutely certain that they do” (Davidson, 1970, p. 29). It is
possible to be incontinent and incontinent action is a real phenomenon;
however, according to Davidson, the weak-willed man does not hold
contradictory beliefs, but only violates the “principle of continence”
and acts and judges irrationally.
As illustrated by this brief review, philosophers often have either
denied or vindicated weakness of will’s possibility. More recently, how-
ever, Holton (Holton, 1999, 2003, 2009) has developed a view by which
he departs from almost all of the literature on the subject. On Holton’s
account, weakness of will is characterized “not as cases in which peo-
ple act against their better judgment, but as cases in which they fail
to act on their intentions” (Holton, 1999, p. 241). Suppose, Holton
notes, there is some action I think I should perform in future, but I
know when the time comes, I will be tempted not to do it. Then,
it would be useful to form an intention now, an intention
that will lead me directly to act when the time comes,
and that will provide some resistance to reconsideration
in the light of the inclinations I shall have then. Simi-
larly, suppose that I know that my future reasoning will
go awry: after a few glasses of wine my confidence in my
own abilities will be absurdly high. Then again it would
be good to form intentions now that are somewhat re-
sistant to reconsideration in the light of those beliefs. In
short, it would be good to have a specific type of intention
that is designed to stand firm in the face of future con-
trary inclinations or beliefs: what I shall call a resolution.
(Holton, 2009, p. 9–10)
An agent reveals weakness of will if he revises the intention he forms to
overcome contrary beliefs and desires he expects to have. Weakness of
will is not acting against one’s best judgment, but failure to persist in
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resolutions. Correspondingly, strength of will is ones success to persist
with his resolutions (Holton, 2003, p.39).
I think a potential advantage of Holton’s view is that it can move
weakness of will from being considered as a problem about the puzzling
nature of acting against one’s best judgment into a more tractable
problem about intention and resolution. This requires a clear con-
ception of resolution. However, precisely what resolution is and what
forming a resolution cognitively involves are left rather underdescribed
in Holton’s account. This is the task I take over in this paper. First, I
briefly discuss the concept of resolution and show that having resolu-
tions involves metarepresentational competence. I think this metarep-
resentational construal provides a framework which allows for a more
natural and empirically oriented account of weakness of will. To
that end, I review a body of evidence from developmental psychol-
ogy which, I argue, supports the view that weakness or strength of
will depends essentially on our metarepresentational skills.
0.6.2 Resolution: A New Psychological Construct
Central to Holton’s account is the notion of irrational intention re-
consideration. An agent reveals weakness of will if he readily revises an
intention he has already formed to overcome his contrary desires and
temptations. Following Bratman (1987) and Harman (1986), Holton
makes a clear, non-reductive, distinction between beliefs, desires and
intentions, and holds that intentions play a role that beliefs and desires
could not. Intentions, unless they are revised, link agents to actions
and are “controlling”. Moreover, intentions have “stability” because
once formed, they have a tendency to persist. Rethinking the previ-
ously formed intentions is too cognitively demanding, but intentions
provide a way of storing decisions so we can act on them when the
time comes without reconsideration (Holton, 1999, 2009). Whereas
this stability makes intentions relatively immune to reconsideration,
what is needed to stand firm against temptations cannot just be an
intention, but a specific type of intention, what Holton calls resolu-
tion. Weak-willed people readily abandon their resolution and those
with strong will-power stick to their resolutions even in the face of
contrary desires. What precisely are resolutions, how they di↵er from
intentions, and what is it that makes them firm against temptations?
Holton notes:
At one extreme we could think of them simply as inten-
tions with a specially high degree of stability. But that
doesn’t seem to get it right. It is no part of the nature of a
resolution that it will be e↵ective; the point is rather that
96
it is meant to be. At the most intellectual level, resolu-
tions can be seen as involving both an intention to engage
in a certain action, and a further intention not to let that
intention be deflected. (Holton, 2009, p. 11)
Resolutions, which are thought of as intentions about a previously
formed intention, are a species of second-order representation.15
We frequently, though often unconsciously, recognize and attribute
mental states to others, but in addition, we are perfectly competent
in detecting mental states in ourselves when, for instance, we become
aware of our own desires, or when checking the consistency of our be-
liefs. This form of metarepresentation is often called metacognition,
or first-person mindreading. Precisely what kinds of mechanisms un-
derpin attribution (or detection) of mental states to self or others has
been a matter of considerable debate over the last few decades, but
much of this debate, for example, whether the underlying processes
are theory-laden or simulation-style, or whether first- and third-person
mindreading are subserved by parallel or dual processes, is orthogo-
nal to our discussion here. Of the accounts that have been o↵ered to
explain the way we access our own mental states, the most promising
one, in my view, is proposed by Nichols & Stich (2003) . On this ac-
count, metacognition involves the capacity (of a form) of introspection
which operates when one is detecting and representing his own mental
states. Nichols & Stich remark,
the basic facts are that when normal adults believe that p,
they can quickly and accurately form the belief I believe
that p; when normal adults desire that p, they can quickly
and accurately form the belief I desire that p; and so
on for other basic propositional attitudes like intend and
imagine. (Nichols & Stich, 2003, p. 160)
On this account, the capacity to form (first-person) metarepresenta-
tions is accomplished by a “Monitoring Mechanism” that takes, for
instance, the belief representation p as input and returns metarepre-
sentations of the form I believe that p.
To form resolutions, one must be able to represent his own inten-
tions. This requires at least a two-step procedure: first, one must
have an idea of his own intention. Having an idea here means that
the person to be capable of classifying intentions as intention in a
way that can recognize them as di↵erent from other related mental
15Belief, desires, and intentions are all first-order representations—representations di-
rected towards the world, though with di↵erent conditions of satisfaction. Resolutions are
second-order representations in which mind represent its own representations.
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states such as beliefs and desires. To achieve this, there must be a
mechanism operation of which brings an intention under the inten-
tion descriptor. What is required here is a Monitoring Mechanism
(Nichols & Stich, 2003) that takes an intention as input, embed it
into the relevant representational schema, and produce a representa-
tion R of his own intention that I intend r. This operation promises
some self-awareness, and that the agent has an idea of his own in-
tention. However, resolutions involve more than this. It is one thing
to have an intention and another thing to have an intention about
your intention. Forming resolutions involves a second step in which
an intention is formed about an already recognized intention. This is
carried out by a process in which Monitoring Mechanism takes R as
input to generate representations of the form I intend that R, where
R is the output of the previous step, and itself a metarepresentation.
Forming resolutions then relies on our ability of metarepresenta-
tion, indeed three representational stages of having an intention, recog-
nizing (and becoming to some extent aware of) your intention, where
this is distinct from recognizing other related mental states, and at
last forming an intention about your intention. Understood this way,
weakness of will turns into a problem in moral psychology, rather than
moral philosophy, such that the plausibility of our understanding of
weakness of will becomes very much dependent on what empirical liter-
ature reveals about our ability of metarepresentation, intention recog-
nition compared to what is experimentally known about our ability
of resisting temptations. But what do we empirically know about our
ability to forgo immediate temptations? Experimental investigation
on this ability began almost 50 years ago.
Mischel and colleagues developed the delay of gratification paradigm
in which children were tested by creating a conflict between the temp-
tation of taking an immediately available reward or waiting for a more
preferred but delayed one. Children are typically seated in front of a
table with a bell and rewards on it (e.g. marshmallows, two grouped
and one apart). The child then faces a dilemma. The subject is told
that the experimenter must leave the room for now, and she can get
two marshmallows if she can wait for the experimenters return, but
only one if she rings the bell and ends the delay. Results of an early
study (Mischel & Mischel, 1987) show that 4-year-olds face serious
di culty to overcome temptations. However, within a year their per-
formance in the test significantly improves mainly by rejecting arous-
ing thoughts about temptations (Mischel & Mischel, 1987; Mischel,
Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). Thompson et al. (Thompson, Barresi, &
Moore, 1997) used a modified version of delay of gratification to test
3- to 5-year-olds in conflict situations, where the subjects had a choice
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between two desirable alternatives: self-gratification now or forgoing
current desires to gratify their own future desires, or the current or
future desires of another child (shared gratification). Consistent with
previous findings, results by Thompson et al. demonstrate that chil-
dren younger than 4 show significantly less future-oriented prudence
(benefits for self) and altruism (benefiting others) than older children.
Following previous studies, Kerr & Zelazo (2004) created a child
variant of the Iowa Gambling task in which children chose between
two decks of cards, where one deck o↵ered more rewards (candies) per
trial but were disadvantageous due to large losses, and the other deck
contained fewer rewards but were advantageous overall. It is expected
that over time and after several trials, when children learn about the
decks, those who can resist temptations should be able to forgo imme-
diate rewards and wait for better, but delayed options. Kerr & Zelazo
found that children younger than 4 made more disadvantageous than
would be expected by chance. Besides, they observed that younger
children’s performance did not improve across trials.
Using a similar version of the Iowa Gambling task, Garon & Moore
(2007) examined one hundred and eighty-one children to assess age-
related changes in performance on the gambling task, and association
of the gambling task with a delay of gratification task. Garon & Moore
found performance on the gambling task was significantly associated
with performance on the delay of gratification task. The results con-
firmed previous findings by Kerr & Zelazo (2004); unlike 4.5-year-olds
who showed a preference for the good deck, 3.5-year-old children se-
lected more from the bad deck. Moreover, Garon & Moore tested
children with awareness questions, asking them which deck was better
or worse and why. Interestingly, they found that 3.5-year-olds, who
could correctly tell which deck was best, failed to resist temptations
and choose from this deck in the following block. In a second experi-
ment, Garon & Moore (2007) explored the e↵ect of labeling decks on
children’s performance. The labeling, while improved the performance
of 4.5-year-olds, had no e↵ect on the performance of younger children.
Overall, the evidence from these and other studies strongly sug-
gests that the ability to resist temptations becomes more likely with
increasing age and is almost impossible before 4 years of age. The
crucial question now is how well this developmental outcome meshes
with our understanding of weakness of will? If weakness of will is one’s
failure to persist in resolutions, then children at or above 4 years of
age who, according to the above findings, resist temptations do so be-
cause they are in fact capable of forming resolutions, whereas younger
children fail. Now, considering that resolutions involve metarepresen-
tation and intention recognition, this requires:
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(1) children who can resist temptations must be capable of metarep-
resentation and intention recognition, and
(2) younger children who fail to resist temptations also be hardly
capable of metarepresentation and intention recognition.
However, it would be a serious challenge for the above understanding
of weakness of will and our second-order construal of resolutions if it
turns out that:
(3) children can resist temptations before the time they become
capable of metarepresentation and intention recognition, or
(4) children fail to resist temptations even after the time they be-
come capable of metarepresentation and intention recognition.
In what follows, I will argue that conditions (3) and (4) hardly
square with what we find about childrens ability of metarepresenta-
tion and intention recognition. To support (1) and (2), I discuss a
body of empirical evidence from developmental psychology which, I
contend, demonstrates that younger children with di culty to over-
come temptations also fail to recognize intentions and represent men-
tal representations, whereas children who show strength of will face
no di culty.
0.6.3 Weakness of Will Psychologized
It is one thing to have mental states and quite a di↵erent thing to
understand and have a concept of mental states. To have a concept of
belief requires understanding that beliefs are representations of real-
ity, and not reality itself. Human mind represents objects and states
of a↵airs in the world, but human adults also realize that (first-order)
mental representations are themselves potential objects of representa-
tion. At what stages of normal human development we come to have
a concept of mind—belief, desire, intention etc.—and understand the
representational nature of mental states? The acid test for the pres-
ence of this ability is the false-belief task. In the original version of the
task, Wimmer & Perner (1983) presented children a puppet show in
which Maxi places his chocolate in the green cupboard and leaves the
scene. A second puppet, Maxi’s Mom, transfers the chocolate from
the green cupboard to the blue cupboard. Children were then asked:
when Maxi returns, where will he look for his chocolate? Wimmer
and Perner found that some 4-year-olds and most 5-year-olds cor-
rectly predict that Maxi will look for the chocolate where she left it.
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To give the correct answer, the child must be able to set aside his own
representations of reality and think about what Maxi thinks about
the chocolate’s location. Children must realize that Maxi has a false
belief, or misrepresentation, of reality. Besides, children who pass the
test understand that people’s beliefs determine how they act. That
is why older children can predict Maxi’s behavior correctly, whereas
3-year-olds and many 4-year-olds fail and wrongly believe Maxi will
look for the marble where the marble actually is.
The results by Wimmer and Perner is supported by other research
in this area. Flavell et al. (Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 1983) presented
children a sponge painted to look like a rock. Children could then
touch and squeeze the object to determine that the rock was, in fact, a
sponge. Next children were asked two questions: “What is this really,
really? Is it really, really a rock, or really, really a piece of sponge?”
and “When you look at this with your eyes right now, does it look like
a rock or does it look like a piece of sponge?” (Flavell et al., 1983,
p. 102). Flavell et al. report that children younger than 4 responded
that the object is a sponge, and it looks like a sponge, whereas older
children answer in the way that adults do. This suggests that children
younger than 4 do not understand mind’s representational capacity:
because they cannot make the appearance-reality distinction, they do
not grasp how something that looks rock can, in fact, be a piece of
sponge.
The results are corroborated by a variant form of the false belief
test, labeled as unexpected content, in which children are shown a fa-
miliar container, often a tube of Smarties (popular British candy), and
asked what is inside. Children often answer as expected: ‘Smarties’.
Next, it is revealed that the real content is something quite di↵erent,
pencils for example. The child faces the test question: what someone
else, the child who is outside the room and has not seen inside the
box, will think is in the box. To answer correctly, children must set
aside their own belief of the box and predict the answer by thinking
what the other child thinks. Studies (Hogrefe, Wimmer, & Perner,
1986; Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987) show that children younger
than 4 attribute their own representation of the real content to the
other child, even though in response to the Ignorance Question 16 they
correctly diagnosed that the other child did not know the real content
of the box.
If, as traditionally thought by some philosophers, we have a privi-
16The Ignorance Question asks “Does [name of the other child] know what is really in
the box, or does he [she] not know that?”. The Belief Question asks “If we ask [name of
the other child], what will he [she] say is in the box?” (Hogrefe, Wimmer, & Perner, 1986,
p. 569).
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leged access to our own mind, then maybe representing our own men-
tal representations must be easier and developmentally earlier than
representing other minds. This view, however, came under attack by
philosophers (Sellars, 1956) and empirical research on the theory of
mind. To examine the ability to understand representational change
in oneself, Gopnik and Astington (1988) asked children: “When you
first saw the box, before we opened it, what did you think was in-
side it? Did you think there were Smarties inside it or did you thing
there were pencils inside it?” (Gopnik & Astington, 1988, p. 29). In
correspondence with previous findings, the results show that children
under 4 barely appreciate representational change and that one’s past
and present representations may contrast.
A considerable concern about the above findings is that the false-
belief test might underestimate children’s metarepresentational com-
petence. One di culty with the test is that the child is never told
the protagonist’s belief, but, from what the child sees, he or she must
infer that Maxi still believes the chocolate is in its original location.
This probably makes the test unnecessarily di cult. It would be cog-
nitively less demanding if the child is told directly about the protag-
onist’s belief. Wellman & Bartsch (1988) created a simplified version
of the test in which children were told: “Jane’s kitten is really in the
playroom, but Jane thinks the kitten is in the kitchen. Where will
Jane look for her kitten?” (Wellman & Bartsch, 1988, p. 264). The
results show that 3- and many 4-year-olds fail to predict the action
in terms of where the object was believed to be. This suggests chil-
dren’s di culty in the original test were not belief-inference related
but stems from a failure in representing target’s relevant belief even
in an extremely simplified version of the test.
Could the task be linguistically demanding or misleading? Do
children understand the test question in the way adults do? If not,
younger children’s failure demonstrates, in fact, a failure to under-
stand what is communicated than a metarepresentational di culty.
The test question that “where will Maxi look for his chocolate?” may
simply be interpreted as “where will Maxi have to look for his choco-
late?” rather than the intended question that “where will Maxi will
look for his chocolate first?”. Clements & Perner (1994) modified the
test question to explicitly communicate which point in time is being
asked in the question. The results show no significant di↵erence in
childrens responses whether the word ‘first’was used (36% passing) or
not (32% passing). Similarly, Gopnik & Astington (1988) obtained
no di↵erence in children’s performance when included a wider range
of syntactic forms of the question, and Moses & Flavell (1990) found
younger children would not do better even in very rich context when
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the task is made easy by giving children very strong belief cues.
Di↵erent studies have tried easier methodological variants of the
test, but results from a meta-analysis of 178 false-belief studies by
Wellman and colleagues (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001), which
examined e↵ects of those variables that might influence childrens per-
formance, revealed that no set of manipulations can enhance younger
children’s performance to above chance. The meta-analysis study and
other evidence all seem to point to the conclusion that younger chil-
drens performance in the false-belief test demonstrates a conceptual,
metarepresentational di culty beyond any di culties related to task
requirements.
This conclusion, however, has been called into question by a grow-
ing body of more recent research on infants and younger children.
Using indirect behavioral methods, rather than explicit judgments,
several studies report a dissociation between performance on a verbal
measure and behavioral measure on the false-belief test. Clements
and Perner (1994) found that most 3-year-olds, despite making incor-
rect judgments on the verbal measure, show a looking pattern con-
sistent with the correct (initial) location of the object. Several other
studies (Garnham & Perner, 2001; Garnham & Ru↵man, 2001; Low,
2010) report that, despite providing incorrect verbal prediction, chil-
dren looked in anticipation to the correct location. Besides, using
methods other than eye tracking, several studies have obtained simi-
lar results for even younger children. O’Neill (1996) examined whether
2-year-old children take into account their parents mental state during
communication. The child was introduced to a toy that was placed
in a container on a high shelf. When asking for help in retrieving the
toy, children significantly more often named the toy, named its loca-
tion, and gestured to its location when a parent had not witnessed
these events than when she or he had, suggesting that children even
at the age of 2 modify their behavior according to what they think
their parents think.
Using the violation-of-expectation paradigm, several studies claim
for the metarepresentational competence even in younger children.
Southgate, Senju, & Csibra (2007) present data which, according to
the authors, strongly suggest that 25-month-olds make anticipatory
saccades on the basis of false belief attribution. Onishi and Baillargeon
(2005) found that 15-month-old babies look significantly longer when
the protagonist’s action was inconsistent with his false belief than
when it was consistent. Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello (2009)
obtained similar results for 18-month-old infants, and results from
Surian, Caldi, and Sperber (2007) pushes the age down to 13 months.
The findings are confirmed by results from other studies as well (Scott
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& Baillargeon, 2009; Song, Onishi, Baillargeon, & Fisher, 2008; Tru-
ble, Marinovi, & Pauen, 2010).
Does the evidence show metarepresentational competence in stages
that are developmentally earlier than the time obtained from previous
studies? I think not. Several comments about the interpretation of
these findings are in order. First, almost all of the evidence for early
metarepresentational ability comes from looking-time paradigm, but
what exactly can be inferred from looking time? The question has
been controversial (Haith, 1998; Kagan, 2008). The essential premise
of the looking paradigm is that infants look longer at unexpected
events than those that are expected, but why should we suppose that
prolonged looking-time demonstrates high-level cognitive processing,
for instance, that the infants expected the protagonist to search for the
toy according to his false belief? Prolonged looking time does demon-
strate a behavioral disruption, or that some pattern is detected, but
it is less than clear why this finding should count as an indicator of
high-level cognitive processing such as belief, reasoning or metarep-
resentation. Besides, even failure to show a more looking time to an
event does not mean that the infant experienced no expectancy vio-
lation. In a study by Kagan et al. ( Kagan, Linn, Mount, Reznick,
& Hiatt, 1979), infants did not show increased attention to a novel
stimulus even when the old and new stimuli were known to be dis-
criminable. In addition, results from looking-time pattern has not
always been consistent: whereas Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) report
violation of expectation in 15-month-old infants, Clements and Perner
(1994) found no such e↵ect in children younger than about 3.
Second, earlier metarepresentational competence is not definitely
implied by the evidence because there is a rival, comparatively defla-
tionary, interpretation of the findings that would not warrant this con-
clusion. The rival interpretation would say younger children’s perfor-
mance in these experiments can be based on behavioral rules (Perner &
Ru↵man, 2005). In the experiment by Onishi and Baillargeon (2005),
what is observed is that 15-month-old infants expect the protagonist
to act in a particular way. This expectation, however, can be based
on a behavioral rule, in this case, infants may innately be disposed to
assume that agents search for an object where they last saw it and
not necessarily in its actual place. Based on behavioral rules, infants
form a set of expectations and make predictions (from behavior to be-
havior) requiring no conception of the mind. The findings by Onishi
and Baillargeon is compatible with the assumption that 15-month-old
infants take into account the protaganist’s mental state, but it is also
equally compatible with the assumption that infants predict future
behavior from current behavior without understanding mental states
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as the mediating step. It is more parsimonious to assume that younger
children take into account only observable behaviors. One might ob-
ject that this criticism applies to older children too, but adults and
children who pass the false-belief test demonstrate metarepresentional
competence in a variety of situations, and only the presence of this
ability can explain why they make correct predictions at di↵erent sit-
uations (Penn & Povinelli, 2007; Perner & Ru↵man, 2005; Povinelli
& Giambrone, 1999; Povinelli & Vonk, 2004).
To be clear, the claim is not that younger children show no under-
staning of mental states, but they have general di culty in metarep-
resentation. Besides, even if younger children understand mental rep-
resentations, they are not aware of this understanding. When children
give an incorrect verbal answer, but look correctly to where the pro-
tagonist would search for the object, do they have conscious knowledge
of where the character would search, or they are unaware of this pos-
sibility? To examine the question, Ru↵man and colleagues (Ru↵man,
Garnham, Import, & Connolly, 2001) asked children to bet the coun-
ters on where they think the protagonist would search for the object.
If eye gaze indexes conscious knowledge, children should bet counters
on where they look. However, Ru↵man et al. found that children
who showed correct eye gaze, but an incorrect explicit verbal answer,
bet very highly on the location consistent with their explicit answer.
This finding not only suggests that young children are very confident
about their (wrong) explicit answer, but seem completely unaware of
the knowledge they convey through their eye gaze.
Resolutions, however, involve more than an unconscious under-
standing of mental states. If an agent decides to overcome a desire,
for example, to resist the temptation of smoking a cigarette, the agent
not only must be able to represent this intention, but also to be aware,
at least to some degree, of having this intention, especially if the agent
is going to form a second intention—that is, to form a resolution—
about this previously formed intention.17 To achieve this, the agent
not only must be able to represent mental representations but also
can recognize particular representations as intention. Can children
recognize intentions before the time they can resist temptations?
I argued that children who fail to resist temptations also fail to rep-
resent mental representations. I now argue that weak-willed children
fail to recognize intentions either. Several studies show recognition
of intentions and goal-directed actions in very young children. In a
study by Woodward (1998), infants were habituated to an event in
17mental state representation, even in adults, often occurs below the threshold of con-
sciousness, but the knowledge is such that the agents are often can bring it to the conscious
level upon request.
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which an actor reached for and grasped one of two toys side by side
on a stage. Following habituation, the toy positions were reversed and
infants observed test events in which there was a change either in the
toy the actor reached or the path of reach taken by the actor. Infants
looked longer on new goal/old path trails than on old goal/new path
trials, suggesting that infants at 6 months of age recognized actors
intention and expected the agent to pursue the same goal. Using the
habituation paradigm, other studies have tried to show infants’ abil-
ity to detect goal-directed actions at 3 months of age (Sommerville,
Woodward, & Needham, 2005), attribute goals to non-human agents
by 3- and 5-month olds (Luo, 2011; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005), rec-
ognize the goal-directedness of actions at 10 and 12 months of age
(Brandone & Wellman, 2009), and take the intentional stance by the
first year of life (Csibra, Br, Kos, & Gergely, 2003; Gergely & Csibra,
2003; Gergely, Ndasdy, Csibra, & Br, 1995).
In a study by Meltzof (1995), 18-month-olds were confronted with
an adult who merely demonstrated an intention to act in a certain way.
The adult tried, but failed, to perform the action (for example, the
adult tried to pull apart a toy, but failed) and children never saw the
end state. It was hypothesized that children who recognize intention
read through the body movements to the underlying intention of the
action. Otherwise, they would interpret behavior in purely physical
terms. Meltzof found that, when given a chance to act on the objects
themselves, 18-month-olds reproduced the acts the adults intended to
do even though the adult failed. The result, according to Meltzo↵,
suggests that children di↵erentiate between the surface, physical be-
havior and a deeper level of intention recognition. Carpenter et al.
(Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998) found a similar pattern in
children who were, on average, two months younger than subjects in
the study by Meltzo↵. Do the above findings suggest children rec-
ognize intentions before the time they can form resolutions or resist
temptations? I think not.
To begin with, the findings on infants’ understanding of inten-
tion relies mainly on habituation/dishabituation paradigm. Infants
repeatedly observe a stimulus that embodies some conceptual princi-
ple, but once habituated, infants are confronted with test events in
which the conceptual principle is violated. If infants exhibit a greater
visual attention, many researchers conclude that the subjects pos-
sess an understanding of the concept instantiated by original stim-
ulus. This, however, hardly seems to be the best interpretation of
the evidence. According to some theorists (Baird & Baldwin, 2001;
Povinelli, 2001), the dishabituation e↵ect may reflect the operation of
low-level mechanisms that detect physical and temporal regularities in
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actions, and enable observers to identify relevant units in the behav-
ior stream. As Povinelli remarks, “the early detection of structural
regularities of behavior are not, strictly speaking, the early manifes-
tation of the uniquely human system for reasoning about intentions”
(Povinelli, 2001, pp. 240-241). Under this interpretation, understand-
ing intentions requires a higher-level, psychological, mechanism which
enables observers to make sense of the units in the behavior stream,
but the higher- and low-level systems are evolutionarily and develop-
mentally dissociable. So infants’ detection of behavioral regularities
does not necessarily imply any understanding of intention.
Besides, because the above studies rely on the assumption that
intentional actions are cognitively harder to understand than non-
intentional ones, many researchers feel comfortable to attribute in-
tention understanding to children once they observe subjects’ ability
to recognize intentional actions. However, studies have shown that
children and adults quickly develop a default (implicit) explanatory
bias, where subjects’ analysis and understanding of all actions are
judged to be intentional by default (Kelemen, 1999; Kelemen & Ros-
set, 2009; Rosset, 2008). If so, contrary to the above assumption,
judging actions as intentional is easier and requires less cognitive re-
sources than judging them as non-intentional. Thus, apart from inves-
tigating when children understand intentions, research especially on
young children must also take into account children’s understanding
of non-intentional actions. This view has been recently developed by
Rosset & Rottman (2014), on which children’s judgments are by de-
fault intentionally driven, but this default over-attribution of intention
is gradually tapered o↵ and inhibited through children’s experience
with non-intentional actions.
Now, even if the above evidence implies some understanding of
intention—admitting that intention is not an all-or-nothing concept,
but is acquired gradually—the presence of this understanding is lim-
ited to the ways children perceive actions and observable world. It
is limited and close to what Searle (1983) calls intentions-in-action, a
sense of intention which requires no prior plan, reasoning or any de-
cision, but arises spontaneously when one is engaged in bodily move-
ment. However, forming resolution involves shifting attention from
actions and bodily movements to what Searle (1983) calls prior inten-
tions. What is required is a form of intention agents have prior to
performing an action and understand it as the mental cause of action.
When do children understand intentions as the mental cause of ac-
tions? To answer this question, Shultz and colleagues (Shultz, Wells,
& Sarda, 1980) examined children’s ability to distinguish between in-
tentional and mistaken actions. Children were asked to perform a
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number of tasks each of which contained an intentional behavior and
an analogous behavior designed to constitute a mistake, for example,
in repeating tongue twisters, or picking up objects (e.g. shiny penny)
when subjects’ vision was distorted with a set of prism glasses. After
the trials, children were asked: “Did you mean to do that?”. The re-
sults show that children as young as 3 judged that they did not mean
to do what they did during the mistaken trials. However, a consid-
erable concern about this and findings using similar strategy is that,
to answer the questions correctly, children can only use a matching
rule in which information about the stated goal or desire is matched
against the behavioral outcome. If the desire and the outcome match,
then it can be concluded that the outcome was intended, and if there
is a mismatch, then the outcome can be judged as not intended (Ast-
ington & Lee, 1991; Shultz & Wells, 1985). When children pick up
the shiny penny, the outcome satisfies their desire or stated goal and
children judge the action as intended, but during the mistaken trails,
when there is a mismatch between the desire and the outcome, the
action is judged as not intended.
To understand intentions as the mental cause of actions, children
must recognize intentions as di↵erent from other related mental states
such as desires. To examine this, we need to look at situations where
the matching strategy could not be used, for instance, in situations
where an actor’s desire or goal is never stated, or in experimental de-
signs in which desire is fulfilled but intention is not. This condition
is met in an early study by Smith (1978) in which subjects, while
remained unaware of the actors desire or goal, watched a series of
videotapes in which a young woman performed voluntary (arm exer-
cises, sitting down on a chair etc.) and involuntary (yawning, sneezing
etc.) actions. Smith found that children at 4 and younger judged all
voluntary and involuntary actions as intentional, suggesting their fail-
ure to understand the causal link between intentions and actions. In a
di↵erent study, Astington & Lee (1991) presented children with a pair
of stories, in one of them a girl takes some bread outside, throws some
crumbs down, and birds peck them up. In a second story, another
girl takes some bread outside, but it just happens that some crumbs
drop behind the girl, and birds peck them up. Children were asked,
“Which girl meant the birds to eat the crumbs?”. Astington and
Lee found that only 5-year-olds performed quite well, with 3-year-olds
performing only at chance level.
Similarly, to prevent the use of matching strategy, Feinfield et al.
(Feinfield, Lee, Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1999) presented three- and
four-year-olds with illustrated stories in which the story characters’ in-
tention di↵ered both from their desires and from the outcomes: char-
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acters wanted to go to location A (friend’s house) but decided to go
to a place B they disliked (skating rink) because their mother wanted
them to go there. However, because the bus driver gets lost, they un-
intentionally ended up at location A where they really wanted to go.
Children were then given three test questions: (1) Where did X try
to go–location B or A? (2) Remember when X was deciding where to
go? Where did he think he was gonna go– location A or B? (3) Where
does X like to go–location B or A? To show the ability of identifying
characters intention, children had to distinguish intention from the
agent’s desire and from the actual outcome, both of which di↵erent
from the agent’s intention. Feinfield et al. (1999) found that, unlike
the four-year-olds, the three-year-olds performed worse than would be
expected by chance.
Because the story-comprehension tasks like those in Feinfield et
al.s are di cult for younger children—requires the e↵ort of encoding
the narrative of the story—Schult (2002) created a target-hitting game
which consisted of tossing beanbags into colored buckets. The purpose
of the study was to examine children’s ability to identify and distin-
guish their own intentions and desires. In this game, children could
either hit the intended target or a di↵erent target, and could win a
prize or not win a prize in a way that the desire to win the prize could
be satisfied independently of the intention to hit a particular target.
Children then faced to sets of “identification” (What you were trying
to do?) and “satisfaction” questions (Did you do what you were try-
ing to do?). If the children understood intentions, they should have
been able to report which target they were trying to hit regardless
of the outcome of their throw (desired or not). For the identification
questions, the results show that, unlike 4- and 5-year-olds, the 3-year-
olds could not report their intention. When 3-year-olds missed their
intended target, but satisfied by finding a prize, they said they were
aiming for that unintended target all along, suggesting that children at
this age confuse intentions and desires and cannot di↵erentiate them
in a mismatch condition.
Let us recap what we have done so far. Having clarified the con-
cept of resolution, the central claim of the paper was that weakness or
strength of will crucially depends on our metarepresentational skills.
To support this, I presented substantial evidence to show that there is
a solid link between weakness of will and the abilities of metarepresen-
tation and intention recognition. I argued that evidence from develop-
mental psychology suggests agents who experience di culty to resist
temptations also face di culty to recognize intentions and represent
mental representations and agents who show strength of will do so only
after the time they become capable of metarepresentation and inten-
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tion recognition. If this is correct, we should also expect agents with
an underdeveloped ability of metarepresentation be hardly capable of
resisting temptations. We should expect that, for instance, autistic
children, who are known as having metarepresentational deficits, face
serious di culty to resist temptations. Interestingly, this prediction
turns out to be correct. Faja & Dawson (2013) compared 21 children
with autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) and 21 typically developing
children between 6 and 7 years of age on a delay of gratification task.
Results from direct observation and parent report show that ASD
children, who were intellectually at or above the average range, were
incapable of waiting to receive a more desired reward.
As seen, a clear advantage of the view presented here, compared to
the traditional understanding of acting against one’s best judgment,
is that the view not only accounts for a wide range of empirical find-
ings but provides a framework which allows for a more natural and
psychologically oriented understanding of the problem. Rather than
to rely merely on conceptual analysis, the plausibility of the view can
be assessed against further empirical evidence.
Now, is weakness of will possible? Unlike the traditional view, we
need not discuss, deny or vindicate weakness of will’s possibility. It is
part of our life and experience. The crucial question rather is how it
happens and that what mechanisms underlying its occurrence. I have
not o↵ered a complete solution to this question; neither have I thought
Holton’s account provide an adequate answer to this question. In my
view, weakness of will is probably the outcome of several interacting
factors but, given the evidence we reviewed above, metarepresenta-
tion and intention recognition are among the most crucial, perhaps
the most crucial, factors that must be taken into account in future
research.
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0.7 Conclusion
Simulation can succeed as long as there is an isomorphism be-
tween the simulating system and target. Otherwise, how am I jus-
tified in attributing mental states by simulation if I come to know
that my mind or brain treats mental states in a way that is signif-
icantly di↵erent from the targets mind? But if the assumption of
isomorphism is so crucial for simulation, what are the relevant re-
spects of similarity in simulation? I have argued that all the potential
candidates–phenomenological, functional, and neurological–run into
intractable problems. Phenomenological and functional similarity are
not su cient for simulation, and neurological similarity fails to dis-
criminate simulation from non-simulational processes. The problem
can be solved if ST theorists could provide a theory of function, but
I have argued that mirror neurons do not operate according to the
standard simulation prototype. This faces the simulation hypothesis
with a thorny dilemma: either we keep o↵-line simulation within the
bounds of high-level mindreading and define simulation in terms of
neural resemblance only, in which case we face serious problems, or,
to avoid the problems, we generalize o↵-line simulation to low-level
mindreading, in which case the operation of mirror neurons would not
qualify as simulational.
This conclusion might seem too narrow and constraining, espe-
cially if we are convinced by arguments for neurological similarity.
However, I have shown that the most celebrated cases of simulation
at low-level mindreading fail to satisfy the two key proposed similarity
requirements.
But if simulation processes do not show neurological similarity,
on what grounds might the claim that mirror neurons are evidence in
support of ST be justified? Mirror neurons support ST only under the
narrow and localized interpretation of neuronal processing; however, I
have shown that a closer examination of evidence demonstrates that a
cognitive function, in particular, emotion recognition, occurs in a net-
work of brain structures involving multiple cross-regional interactions
in the brain. This suggests that, contrary to what ST theorists argue,
mirror neurons are not incompatible with TT, the information-rich
understanding of mindreading.
Mindreading plays significant roles in a variety of cognitive do-
mains. In pragmatics, most theorists and researchers working today
agree that people in communicative contexts are deeply involved in
metal state attribution, either for what they trying to express or in
recognizing what is expressed. If mindreading is simulational, then it
is expected that the ST account can explain the mindreading exhibited
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in communication. Contrary to this assumption, I have argued that
simulation in this domain would be cognitively too demanding and
virtually ine↵ective in pragmatic interpretation. In addition, I have
shown that, while evidence demonstrates an association between di -
culties in mental state attribution and pragmatic deficits, results from
studies on three clinical populations of autism, schizophrenia, and
fragile X syndrome reveals a dissociation between pragmatic deficits
and simulation. This demonstrates that the underlying mechanisms
of high-level mindreading, at least in the domain of utterance inter-
pretation, cannot be simulational.
Further, I have suggested a link between mindreading and weak-
ness, or strength, of will. How is it that people fail or succeed in resist-
ing temptations? I propose that weakness or strength of will strongly
depends on our ability of first-person mindreading, or metarepresen-
tation, indeed three representational stages of having an intention,
recognizing intention, and forming an intention about your intention.
This suggestion turns weakness of will into a problem in moral psychol-
ogy, rather than moral philosophy, in which we need not discuss, deny
or vindicate weakness of wills possibility, as philosophers have tradi-
tionally done. Under this account, weakness of will is not only possible
but it is an undeniable part of our life and experience. Rather, the
crucial question now is how it happens and what psychological/neural
mechanisms underpin its occurrence.
Questions concerning mindreading has been debated for more than
two decades, but unlike the early debates which were more like a two-
sided battle between theory and simulation, more recent theorists con-
sider mindreading as a complex phenomenon which takes elements of
both theory and simulation. This approach has been fruitful, adopted
by many others and has resulted in several hybrid theories. Yet a
di↵erent strategy in following this approach would be to evaluate the
explanatory power of theory or simulation with respect to the roles
mindreading plays in di↵erent domains and in connection with various
cognitive functions. I have tried this approach in pragmatics, moral
psychology, and emotion recognition. It remains for future research
to explore and assess mindreading in other domains.
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